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A Timely Right to Privacy
Stacey A. Tovino*
ABSTRACT: On December 28, 2017, the federal Department ofHealth and
Human Services ("HHS") settled its fiftieth case involving potential
violations of the privacy, security, and breach notification rules ("Rules")
that implement the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA") and the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act ("HITECH"). This Article catalogues and examines
currently available enforcement actions involving the HIPAA and HITECH
Rules, including the cases in which HHS has entered into a settlement
agreement with a HIPAA covered entity or business associate, the cases in
which HHS has imposed a civil money penalty on a HPAA covered entity,
and the cases in which a state attorney general has entered into a settlement
agreement or consent judgment with a HIPAA covered entity or business
associate.
This Article finds that HHS and state attorneys generalfocus their settlement
and penalty efforts on cases involving groups of patients and insureds,
leaving individuals whose privacy and security rights have been violated out
of the enforcement spotlight. This Article also shows that the execution of
settlement agreements and the imposition of civil money penalties takes a
considerable amount of time-more than seven years in some cases-resulting
in a lack of timely attention to the privacy and security rights of both groups
and individuals. Finally, this Article reveals that the corrective action
required by HHS in cases that do not reach the settlement or penalty phase,
when that information is made publicly available, tends to be prospective in
nature. Although prospective action helps safeguard future rights, it does little
to remedy past harms. Arguing that HITECH's improved enforcement
provisions do little to support individual rights to privacy and security, this
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Article proposes three new federal regulations. If adopted by HHS, these
regulations will improve the ability of individuals to enforce their rights under
the HIPAA Rules and reduce the time frame within which enforcement takes
place.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical involving a patient who is under the care of a
local physician. The physician, who has not received any privacy or security
training, downloads malicious software ("malware") that disseminates the
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patient's electronic protected health information ("ePHI")' in violation of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") Privacy Rule.2
When the patient learns that her sensitive ePHI has been disclosed without
her authorization, she informs the physician that she is leaving his practice to
seek care under a new provider. The patient requests a paper copy of her
medical record, which she plans to give to her new provider. In violation of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the physician refuses to give the patient a paper copy
of her medical record.s The physician then discards the patient's paper
medical record in a dumpster located behind the physician's clinic, violating
the HIPAA Privacy Rule for a third time.4
Although hypothetical, the facts above are based on several cases in which
the federal Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") and state
attorneys general have entered into settlement agreements or consent
judgments with, or imposed civil money penalties on, covered entities and
i. Electronic protected health information ("ePHI") is "individually identifiable health
information" that is "transmitted by electronic media" or "maintained in electronic media."
45 C.F.R. § 160. 103 (2017).
Individually identifiable health information is information that ...
(i) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health
care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the individual; or
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can
be used to identify the individual.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
2. The HIPAA Privacy Rule is a set of federal regulations that governs covered entities and
business associates with respect to their uses and disclosures of protected health information.
See id. §§ 164-500-.534 (codifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule). The terms "covered entity" and
"business associate" are defined infra notes 36 and 41, respectively. Protected health information
("PHI") is "individually identifiable health information ... that is ... [t] ransmitted by electronic
media[,] ... [m]aintained in electronic media[,] or ... [t]ransmitted or maintained in any other
form or medium." Id. § i 60. 103. Among other obligations, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires
covered entities and business associates to have in place appropriate technical "safeguards to
protect the privacy of [PHI]" and to "reasonably safeguard [PHI] from ... intentional
[and] unintentional use[s] [and] disclosure[s] that ... violat[e]" the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
Id. § 16 4-530(c)( )-(a).
3. See id. § 1 6 4-524(a) (i) (requiring (in most cases) covered entities to provide individuals
with copies of their medical records, billing records, and other PHI that is maintained in a
designated record set, if requested); id. § 164-501 (defining "designated record set" as "[a] group
of records maintained by or for a covered entity," including within that definition medical
records, billing records, enrollment records, payment records, claims adjudication records, and
other records that are "[u]sed, in whole or in part, by or for [a] covered entity to make decisions
about individuals").
4. See id. § 16 4-530(c) (i) (requiring covered entities to "have in place appropriate
... physical safeguards to protect the privacy of [PHI]").
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business associates for violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the HIPAA
Security Rule,5 and the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule6 (collectively, the
"HIPAA Rules"). For example, HHS entered into a settlement agreement with
the University of Washington ("UW") in December 2015 after a UW employee
downloaded malware, resulting in the unauthorized disclosure of the ePHI of
9o,ooo UW patients.7 The settlement agreement contained a $750,000
settlement amount, a detailed corrective action plan, and a requirement for
annual reporting to HHS by UW on its compliance efforts.' By further
example, HHS imposed a $4,351,6oo civil money penalty on Cignet Health
Center in February 2oi after finding that "Cignet violated 41 patients' rights
by denying them access to their medical records."9 By final example, the
Indiana Attorney General entered into a $12,ooo consent judgment in
January 2015 with Joseph Beck, a dentist who discarded more than 6o boxes
5. The HIPAA Security Rule is a set of federal regulations that requires covered entities
and business associates to: "(i) [e]nsure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all
[ePHI] the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, maintains, or transmits," and
"(2) [p]rotect against ... reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of
such [ePHI]." See id. § 164 -3o6(a)(1)-(2); see also id §§ 164-302-.318 (codifying the HIPAA
Security Rule).
6. The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule requires covered entities to notify individuals, the
media, and the Secretary of HHS in certain situations in which a breach of unsecured PHI has
been discovered. See id. §§ 164.400-414 (codifying the Breach Notification Rule).
7. Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and the Board 
of
Regents of the University of Washington on behalf of the University of Washington (U.S. Dep't
Health & Human Servs. Dec. 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/uw-ra-and-cap.pdf;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., $750,000 HIPAA Settlement Underscores
the Need for Organization-Wide Risk Analysis (Dec. 14, 2015) (hereinafter UW Press Release],
available at http://wayback.archive-it.org/392
6 /201701 2 7 i85 4 5 8/https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2015/12/14/75oooo-hipassetlement-undescores-need-for-organization-wide-risk-analysis.html.
8. See UW Press Release, supra note 7 ("The settlement includes a monetary payment of
$750,ooo, a corrective action plan, and annual reports on the organization's compliance efforts.").
9. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Imposes a $4.3 Million
Civil Money Penalty for Violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule (Feb. 22, 201 1), available at
http://wayback.archive-it.org/392
6 /201401 o8 16224 9 /http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201 I
pres/o2/20 11022 2a.html (" [The Office for Civil Rights] found that Cignet violated 41 patients'
rights by denying them access to their medical records . . . . The HIPAA Privacy Rule requires
that a covered entity provide a patient with a copy of their medical records within 30 . . . days of
the patient's request."); see also Notice of Final Determination from Georgina Verdugo, Dir.,
Office for C.R., to Daniel E. Austin, Cignet Health Ctr. (Feb. 4, 201 1) [hereinafter Notice of Final
Determination, Cignet], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/
examples/cignetpenaltyletter.pdf (imposing a $4,351,6oo civil money penalty on Cignet
Health); Notice of Proposed Determination from Georgina C. Verdugo, Dir., Office for C.R., U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Daniel E. Austin, Cignet Health Ctr. [hereinafter Notice of
Proposed Determination, Cignet], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
enforcement/examples/cignetpenaltynotice.pdf ("Several of the individuals informed Cignet
that they were requesting copies of their medical records so that they could obtain health care
services from physicians other than those who were workforce members of Cignet.").
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of dental records containing the paper protected health information ("PHI")
of more than 5,6oo patients in an Indianapolis dumpster. o
Between April 14, 2003, the compliance date for the HIPAA Privacy
Rule," and August 1, 2018, HHS has enforced the HIPAA Rules only 56 times
through settlement agreements 2 and civil money penalty determinations.'s
The Author, who teaches the HIPAA Rules at law schools across the country'4
and represents a number of patients and insureds in pro bono privacy and
security matters, has submitted several complaints to HHS following
intentional and flagrant violations of the HIPAA Rules with little
governmental response.'5 Inspired by the handful of enforcement actions to
date as well as the frustration of the Author's own clients, who have
unsuccessfully attempted to enforce their rights in a timely manner, this
Article assesses the ability of an individual to enforce rights provided for in
the HIPAA Rules, with a focus on the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II summarizes the HIPAA Privacy
Rule, highlighting provisions frequently violated by covered entities as well as
HHS's administrative enforcement process.' 6 Part III makes a novel
to. See Consent Judgment at 3, 11 7-8, State v. Beck, No. 4 9Dio 14 12 PLo4 161 3 (Ind.
Cir./Super. Ct., Marion Cty.Jan- 5, 2015) ("The Defendant agrees to pay twelve thousand dollars
($12,ooo) at the execution of this judgment.... These funds shall be paid to the Office of the
Indiana Attorney General."); State Settles with Former Dentist Accused of Dumping Patient Files,
KoKoMo PERSPECTIVE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://kokomoperspective.com/kp/state-settles-with-former-
dentist-accused-of-dumping-patient-files/article 3 a5 dbbfc-g8 3 i -1 e4-b 5 ee-2fb 4 d5 ff86 7 a.html ("The
state has reached a settlement with former Kokomo-area dentist, Dr.Joseph Beck, for mishandling
medical records containing sensitive information of more than 5,6oo patients.").
11. 45 C.F.R. § 164.534(a)-(b)(1), (c) (2017).
12. See Stacey A. Tovino, PowerPoint Presentation Keynote Address at ith Annual Beazley
Symposium on Health Law & Policy, Patient Privacy: Problems, Perspectives, and Opportunities,
at slides 24-36 (Nov. 10, 2017) (on file with author) (collecting and summarizing HHS's
settlement agreements as of November 1o, 2017). SeeinfraAppendix A (cataloguing the 52 cases
in which HHS has entered into settlement agreements with covered entities).
13. See infra Appendix B (cataloguing the four cases in which HHS has imposed a civil
money penalty on a covered entity). See generally Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Enforcement Highlights, HHS.GOV (June 30, 2018) [hereinafter HHS, Enforcement
Hhlights], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/enforcement-
highlights/20 i8-june/index.html (providing other enforcement data).
14. See, e.g., Stacey Tovino, Health Information Privacy and Technology (Fall 2o 7)
(Syllabus, Loyola University Chicago School of Law) (on file with author); Stacey Tovino, HIPAA
Privacy Law (Jan. 2018) (Syllabus, Saint Louis University School of Law) (on file with author);
Stacey Tovino, HIPAA Privacy Law (Spring 2017) (Syllabus, William S. Boyd School of Law) (on
file with author).
15. See, e.g., E-mail from the Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Stacey
A. Tovino (Apr. 10, 2017, 10: 5 2 AM) (on file with author) ("Thank you for filing a complaint via
the website of the Office for Civil Rights ... at [HHS]. This is an automated response to
acknowledge receipt of your complaint. Your complaint will be assigned to an OCR staff member
for review and appropriate action.").
16. See infra Part II.
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contribution17 to the patient privacy and security literatures by cataloguing
and examining the 52 cases in which HHS has entered into a settlement
agreement with a covered entity,,8 the four cases in which HHS has imposed
a civil money penalty on a covered entity,'9 and the 15 cases in which a state
attorney general has entered into a settlement agreement or consent
judgment with a covered entity or business associate o for violations of the
HIPAA Rules.
Part III shows how HHS and state attorneys generally focus their
settlement and penalty efforts on cases involving groups of patients and
insureds, leaving individuals whose privacy and security rights have been
violated out of the enforcement spotlight.21 Part III also shows how the
execution of settlement agreements and the imposition of civil money
penalties takes considerable time-over seven years in some cases-resulting
in a lack of timely attention to the privacy and security rights of both groups
and individuals.22 Part III further reveals that the corrective action required
by HHS in cases that do not reach the settlement or penalty phase tends to be
prospective in nature.2 3 Although prospective action protects future rights, it
does little to remedy past harms.24 Part III concludes by arguing that the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act's
improved enforcement provisions fail to remedy past privacy and security
violations.25
To correct these limitations, Part IV justifies and proposes a new federal
regulation that would allow private parties who assist HHS in identifying
violations of the HIPAA Rules to receive a percentage of any settlement
amount or civil money penalty imposed by HHS.2 6 Part V recommends a
second federal regulation that would allow private parties harmed by
violations of the HIPAA Rules to enforce their privacy and security rights
17. Prior scholarship in this area has described a few settlement agreements or civil money
penalty cases but has neither catalogued nor identified trends among all available federal and
state enforcement actions. See generally, e.g., David Thomas et al., IIIIS Issues First-Ever Civil
Monetasy Penalty for IHPAA Privacy Rule Violation, 3 HEALT I T L. & INDUSTRY 1 (201 1) (discussing
only HHS's first civil money penalty case against Cignet Health); Esther H. Yu, IllPAA Privacy and
Security: Analysis of Recent Enforcement Actions, 15 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 59 (2013)
(summarizing only two enforcement actions involving Idaho State University and Shasta Regional
Medical Center).
18. See infra Part III; inja Appendix A.
19. See infra Part III; infra Appendix B.
20. See infra Part III; infra Appendix C.
2 1. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part HI.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
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through litigation.27 Part VI suggests a third regulation that would exclude
covered entities from Medicare and Medicaid participation if they grossly and
flagrantly, or repeatedly, violate the HIPAA Rules.28 If adopted by HHS, these
regulations will improve the ability of individuals to enforce rights made
available under the HIPAA Rules and shorten the time frame within which
enforcement takes place.
This Article concludes by considering the role of federal regulations that
are not enforced, or that are enforced infrequently, both in general and with
respect to particular individuals.29 HHS has an abundance of health, safety,
and welfare regulations that are neither audited nor enforced on a timely
basis, raising questions regarding agency discretion in terms of cases selected
for enforcement, inconsistent agency enforcement of like violations, non-
enforcement of federal regulations as a form of deregulation, and
whistleblower incentives and private rights of action as solutions for agency
inaction.
II. SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIvAcY RULE
As signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") had several purposes:
including "improve[ing] portability and continuity of health insurance
coverage in the group and individual markets," combating health care fraud
and abuse, "promot[ing] the use of medical savings accounts[,]
... improv[ing] access to long-term care services and [insurance] coverage,"
and "simplify [ing] the administration of health insurance."3o
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part VI.
29. See infra Part VII.
30. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
j0o Stat. 1936, 1936 ("An Act [t]o amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual markets, to
combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the use
of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify
the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes."). In a number of prior articles,
the Author has carefully reviewed the history, application, and general framework of the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Complying with the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Problems and
Perspectives, i Loy. U. CHI.J. REG. COMPLIANCE 23, 25-28 (2016) (detailing the history of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, its application to covered entities and business associates, and its basic use
and disclosure rules); Stacey A. Tovino, The IfPAA Privacy Rule and the EU GDPR: Illustrative
Comparisons, 47 SETON HALL L. REv. 973, 975-79 (2017) (stating the same); Stacey A. Tovino,
Silence Is Golden ... Except in Health Care Philanthropy, 48 U. RicH. L. REV. 1157, 1 161-70 (2014)(stating the same); Stacey A. Tovino, Teaching the IlPAA Privacy Rule, 61 ST. Louis U. L.J. 469,
471-75 (2017) (stating the same). With updates and technical changes, the brief summary of the
Privacy Rule set forth in Part H of this Article is taken with the permission of the Author from
these prior publications.
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HIPAA's Administrative Simplification Provisions, codified at Subtitle F
of Title II of the statute,3' directed HHS to issue regulations protecting the
privacy of individually identifiable health information if Congress failed to
enact comprehensive privacy legislation within three years of HIPAA's
enactment.3 2 When Congress failed to enact privacy legislation by its deadline,
HHS incurred the duty to adopt privacy regulations.33
HHS responded. On November 3, 1999,34 and December 28, 20o0,35
HHS issued a proposed and final privacy rule ("HIPAA Privacy Rule")
regulating covered entities'3 6 uses and disclosures of PHI. On March 27,
2oo2,37 and August 14, 2o02,38 HHS issued proposed and final modifications
to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. With the exception of technical corrections and
conforming amendments,39 these rules as reconciled remained largely
unchanged between 2002 and 2009.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act ("ARRA") into law.4o Division A, Title XIII of ARRA,
31. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, §§ 261-264.
32. Id. § 264(c)(1) ("If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information ... is not enacted by the date that is 36 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of [HHS] shall promulgate final regulations
containing such standards .. . .").
33. See id.; Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Summary of the IIIPAA
Privacy Rule, HHS.cov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/
index.html (last reviewed July 26, 2013) ("Because Congress did not enact privacy legislation,
HHS developed a proposed rule and released it for public comment on November 3, 1999. The
Department received over 52,000 public comments. The final regulation, the Privacy Rule, was
published December 28, 2000.").
34. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918
(proposed Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160-64)-
35. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462
(Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 4 5 C.F.R. pts. s6o, 164)-
36. Covered entities are defined to include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and
those "health care provider[s] who transmit [any] health information in electronic form in
connection with [standard] transaction[s]." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017).
37. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 14,776
(proposed Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. s6o, 164)-
38. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53, 182
(Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. s6o, 164).
39. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 Fed.
Reg. 12,434, 12,434 (Feb. 26, 2001) (codified at45 C.F.R. pts. i6o, 164) ("This action corrects
the effective date of the final rules adopting standards for privacy of individually identifiable
health information published on December 28, 2000, in the Federal Register (65 FR 82462),
resulting in a new effective date of April 14, 2001." (emphasis omitted)); Technical Corrections
to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information Published December
28, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,944, 82,944 (Dec. 29, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 16o, 164)
("These technical corrections address changes that inadvertently were excluded from the
preamble of the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information published
December 28, 2ooo.").
40. SeeAmerican Recovery and ReinvestmentAct of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1 1 1-5, § 13001-13424,
123 Stat. 115, 226-79.
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better known as the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act ("HITECH"), contained certain provisions requiring HHS
to expand the application of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to business associates,41
modify some of the use and disclosure requirements,2 adopt new breach
notification rules,43 provide education regarding the Privacy Rule44 and, of
importance to this Article, improve enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.45
HHS responded with proposed and final rules onJuly 14, 2010,46 andJanuary
25, 2013,47 respectively.
As amended over time during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
administrations, the HIPAA Privacy Rule strives to balance the interest of
individuals in maintaining the confidentiality of their health information with
the interests of society in obtaining, using, and disclosing health information
to carry out a variety of public and private activities.48 To this end, the HIPAA
Privacy Rule now regulates covered entities' and business associates' uses of,
disclosures of, and requests for individually identifiable health information
("IIHI")i9 to the extent such information does not constitute: (1) an
education record protected under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 17934 (2012) (providing the "[a]pplication of privacy provisions and
penalties to business associates of covered entities"). Business associates ("Bas") are defined to
include individual and institutions who: (i) on behalf of a covered entity, "but other than in the
capacity of a member of the workforce of [a] covered entity ... create[], receive[], maintain[],
or transmit[] protected health information for a function or activity regulated by" the HIPAA
Privacy Rule; and (2) "[p]rovide[], other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce of
such covered entity, legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation, . . . management,
administrative, accreditation, or financial services to or for [the] covered entity." Modifications
to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules Under the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5,566, 5,688 (Jan.
25, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pgs. 16o, 164) [hereinafter Final HITECH Rules] (providing a
new definition of business associate).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 17935 (provoding "[r]estrictions on certain disclosures and sales of
health information").
43. See id. § 17932 (requiring "[n]otification in the case of breach").
44. See id. § 17933 (titled "Education on health information privacy").
45. See id. § 17939 (titled "Improved enforcement").
46. See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg- 40,868
(proposedJuly 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. i6o, 164).
47. See Final HITECH Rules, supra note 41.
48. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 16o, 164) ("The rule seeks to balance
the needs of the individual with the needs of the society."); id. at 82,468 ("The task of society and
its government is to create a balance in which the individual's needs and rights are balanced
against the needs and rights of society as a whole."); id. at 82,472 ("The need to balance these
competing interests-the necessity of protecting privacy and the public interest in using
identifiable health information for vital public and private purposes-in a way that is also
workable for the varied stakeholders causes much of the complexity in the rule.").
49. See45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2017) (defining individually identifiable health information).
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Act of 1974 ("FERPA"); (2) a student treatment record excepted from
protection under FERPA; (3) an "employment record[] held by a covered
entity in its role as [an] employer;" or (4) individually identifiable health
information "regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50
years."5o The HIPAA Privacy Rule calls the subset of IIHI described in the
previous sentence "protected health information" ("PHI").5'
Before using or disclosing PHI, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered
entities and business associates to adhere to one of three different rules
depending on the purpose of the information use or disclosure.52 The first
rule allows covered entities and business associates to use and disclose PHI
with no prior permission from the individual who is the subject of the PHI
-but only in certain situations.53 That is, covered entities may freely use and
disclose PHI without any form of prior permission in order to carry out certain
treatment,54 payment,55 and health care operations5 6 activities,57 as well as
certain public benefit activities>5
Under the second rule, a covered entity may use and disclose an
individual's PHI for certain activities, but only if "the individual is informed
in advance of the use or disclosure and has the opportunity to agree to[,]
50. See id. (defining "[p]rotected health information").
51. See id. (using the phrase "[p]rotected health information").
52. See id. §§ 164.502-.514 (setting forth the use and disclosure requirements regarding
PHI applicable to covered entities and business associates).
53. See id. §§ 164-502-.504-
54. See, e.g., §§ 164.502(a) (i) (ii), 164.506. Among other activities, treatment includes "the
provision, coordination, or management of health care and related services by one or more
health care providers." Id. § 164.50 1.
55. See, e.g., §§ 164 -5 02(a)(1)(ii), 164.506. Payment activities are "[t]he activities
undertaken by ... a health plan to obtain premiums or to determine or fulfill its responsibility
for coverage and provision of benefits under the health plan" as well as the activities of"[a] health
care provider or health plan to obtain or provide reimbursement for the provision of health
care." Id. § 164-501.
56. The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines "health care operations" with respect to a list of
activities that are related to a covered entity's covered functions. See id. (defining "health care
operations"). These activities include, but are not limited to, "[c]onducting quality assessment
and improvement activities[,] ... conducting training programs in which" medical and other
health care students learn to practice health care under supervision, and arranging for the
provision of "legal services." Id.
57. See id. § 164.506(c) (O) (permitting "[a] covered entity [to] use or disclose [PHI] for its
own treatment, payment, or health care operations"); id. § 164 -506(c)()-(4) (permitting a
covered entity to disclose PHI to certain recipients for the recipients' "treatment, payment, or
health care operations" activities, respectively).
58. See, e.g., § 164-5 12(k) (6). Covered entities may use and disclose PHI for 12 different
public policy activities without the prior written authorization of the individual who is the subject
of the information. See id. § 164-512(a)-(1). These public policy activities include, but are not
limited to, "[u]ses and disclosures required by law," "[u]ses and disclosures for public health
activities," disclosures for law enforcement activities, uses and disclosures for research, and
disclosures for workers' compensation activities. See id. § 164-512(a), (b), (f), (i), (1).
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prohibit[] or restrict the use or disclosure."so The third rule-a default rule
-requires covered entities and business associates to obtain the prior written
authorization from the individual who is the subject of the PHI before using
or disclosing the individual's PHI in any situation that does not fit under the
first or second rule.6 o In the cases it investigates, HHS has identified these
three rules (collectively, the "Use and Disclosure Requirements") as the most
frequently violated requirements of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.6 - The third Use
and Disclosure rule was violated by the physician in the hypothetical that
opened this Article when the physician downloaded malware that resulted in
the unauthorized disclosure of his patient's ePHI.
In addition to the Use and Disclosure Requirements, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule also gives individuals five rights with respect to their PHI, including the
right to receive a notice of privacy practices,6 2 a right to request additional
privacy protections, 63 a right to access PHI (including the right to receive a
paper or electronic copy of PHI),64 a right to request amendment of PHI,65
and "a right to receive an accounting of disclosures of [PHI] "66 (collectively,
the "Individual Rights"). Covered entities frequently violate the third
Individual Right, which requires individuals to be given access to their PHI.67
This right was violated by the physician in the hypothetical that opened this
Article when he refused to give his patient a copy of her medical record.
Finally, the Privacy Rule contains a set of administrative requirements,
such as designating privacy personnel, training workforce members,
safeguarding PHI, establishing a complaint process for individuals who
believe their privacy rights have been violated, sanctioning workforce
members who violate the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and developing privacy policies
and procedures, among other requirements (collectively, the "Administrative
Requirements").68 Covered entities frequently violate the Administrative
Requirements by failing to meet their obligation to safeguard individuals'
59. See id. § 164.510 (titled "Uses and disclosures requiring an opportunity for the
individual to agree or to object")
6o. See id. § 164-508(a) (i) (tided "Uses and disclosures for which an authorization is required")
61. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Top Five Issues in Investigated
Cases Closed with Corrective Action, by Calendar Year, HHS.Gov [hereinafter HHS, Top Five Issues],
https://web.archive.org/web/20170630103320/https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
compliance-enforcement/data/top-five-issues-investigated-cases-closed-corrective-action-calendar-
year/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) (listing impermissible uses and disclosures as the top
issue seen by HHS in investigated cases in years 2004 through 2015).
62. 45 C.F.R. § 164-520.
63. Id. § 164.522.
64. Id. § 164-524.
65. Id. § 164.526.
66. Id. § 164.528.
67. See HHS, Top Five Issues, supra note 6 i (listing the failure to provide access to PHI as the
third most frequent HIPAA issue seen by HHS in investigated cases in years 2003 through 201 1
as well as 2o 13).
68- 45 C.F.R. § 164-530.
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PHI. 69 For example, the physician in the hypothetical violated this
requirement when he discarded the patient's medical records in a publicly
accessible dumpster located outside his clinic.
The remedies available to patients who believe their privacy and security
rights have been violated are limited. Under current law, no private right of
action exists for patients and insureds whose rights under the HIPAA Rules
have been violated.7o Under the HIPAA Rules, an individual who is aggrieved
by a privacy or security violation can complain to the covered entity itself,7'
the Secretary of HHS,72 or a state attorney general who has the authority
under HITECH to bring a civil action seeking damages or an injunction on
behalf of a state resident for violations of the HIPAA Rules.73 In response,
HHS74 (and, presumably, a state attorney general) may or will investigate the
case,75 may or will conduct a compliance review of the covered entity or
business associate76 and, if the investigation or review indicates
69. See HHS, Top Five Issues, supra note 61 (listing the failure to appropriately safeguard PHI as
the second most frequent HIPAA issue seen by HHS in investigated cases in years 2oo4 through 2015).
70. See, e.g., Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3 d 569, 572 (5 th Cir. 2006) ("We hold there is no private
cause of action under HIPAA ... ."); Lee-Thomas v. LabCorp, No. 18-591 (RC), 2018 WL
3014824, at *3 (D.D.C. June 15, 2018) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a claim due to the lack of a private right of action); Johnson v. Quander, 37o F.
Supp. 2d 79, 1oo (D.D.C. 2005) ("[B]ecause no private right of action exists under the HIPAA,
this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this claim and it must be dismissed."),
affd, 4 4 o F.3 d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 945 (2006); Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth.
v. Denver Publ'g Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1 142, 1144-46 (D. Colo. 2004) (citing a number of cases
and secondary authorities supporting the rule that HIPAA contains no private right of action).
But see infra Part V (proposing that HHS adopt a new regulation establishing a private right of
action for HIPAA Rules violations).
71. See 45 C.F.R. § 16 4 -5 30(d)(j) (requiring covered entities to provide a process for
individuals to complain about suspected violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule or the covered
entity's privacy policies and procedures). Neither the HIPAA Privacy Rule nor any other law
requires covered entities to make the complaints they receive, or any resolution of such
complaints, publicly available. As such, the Author is unable to evaluate the ability of an individual
to enforce his or her rights under the HIPAA Privacy Rule by complaining to the covered entity.
72. See id. § i60.3o6(a) (giving persons who believe that a covered entity or a business associate
has violated the HIPAA Privacy Rule a right to file a complaint with the Secretary of HHS).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 3 2od- 5 (d) (2012) (authorizing a state attorney general to bring a civil
action or an injunction on behalf of residents of that state for violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
74. The procedures followed by state attorneys general depend on the state although they
are guided by federal law. See id. (setting forth the process by which state attorneys general can
enforce violations of the HIPAA Rules).
75. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 16o.3o6(c)(1) (providing that "[t]he Secretary [of HHS] will
investigate any complaint . .. when a preliminary review of the facts indicates a possible violation
due to willful neglect"); id. § 160.306(c) (2) (providing that "[t]he Secretary may investigate any
other complaint").
76. See, e.g., id. § 160.308(a) (providing that "[t]he Secretary [of HHS] will conduct a
compliance review to determine whether a covered entity or business associate is complying with
the [HIPAA Rules] when a preliminary review of the facts indicates a possible violation due to
willful neglect"); id. § 16O.3o8(b) (providing that "[t]he Secretary [of HHS] may conduct a
IVOL 104:13611372
A TIMELY RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1373
noncompliance, may attempt to reach a resolution with the covered entity or
business associate.77
HHS's resolution options include: (1) the provision of technical
assistance by HHS to the covered entity or business associate and compliance
therewith; (2) demonstrated compliance (also called voluntary compliance or
voluntary cooperation) by the covered entity or business associate; (3) a
settlement agreement that includes a settlement payment to HHS by the
covered entity or business associate; (4) an agreement by the covered entity
or business associate to take corrective action pursuant to a corrective action
plan ("CAP"); (5) the imposition of a civil money penalty; and/or (6) the
referral of the case to the federal Department ofJustice ("DOJ") for criminal
action.7 8 HHS pursues a combination of the third and fourth options-a
settlement plus a CAP-when HHS finds that the covered entity's or business
associate's noncompliance was due to willful neglect or when "the nature and
scope of the noncompliance warrants additional enforcement action."79
HHS pursues the fifth option-the imposition of civil money penalties
-when HHS is unable to resolve the matter through technical assistance,
demonstrated compliance, and/or corrective action (hereinafter,
"agreement").8o If HHS is unable to resolve the matter by agreement, then
HHS will ask the "covered entity or business associate ... to submit written
evidence of any mitigating factors or affirmative defenses" relating to the
entity's HIPAA Rules violations.8 ' Following HHS's receipt of the requested
information, HHS will send the covered entity or business associate a notice
of proposed determination ("NPD"), which announces that a civil money
penalty will be imposed on the covered entity or business associate and
provides the opportunity for the covered entity or business associate to
request a hearing.12 Depending on the outcome of any hearing, the NPD is
compliance review to determine whether a covered entity or business associate is complying with
the [HIPAA Rules] in any other circumstance").
77. See, e.g., id. § 16o-3 12(a)(1).
78. See, e.g., id. (providing that if an investigation or a compliance review indicates
noncompliance with the HIPAA Rules, then "the Secretary [of HHS] may attempt to reach a
resolution of the matter satisfactory to the Secretary by informal means. Informal means may
include demonstrated compliance or a completed corrective action plan or other agreement").
79. See OFFICE FOR C.R., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON HIPAA PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND BREACH NOTIFICATION RULE COMPLIANCE FOR
CALENDAR YEARS 2013 AND 2014, at 4-5, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/rtc-compliance-
20132014.pdf.
8o. See id. at 5.
81- 45 C.F.R. § i6 0.312(a) (3) (i).
82. See id. § 160.312(a) (3) (ii); id. § 160.420 (requiring a notice of proposed determination
("NPD") to be sent to a covered entity or business associate on whom HHS is proposing to impose
a civil money penalty); Notice of Proposed Determination from Leon Rodriguez, Dir., Office for
CR, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Paul Tripp, Gen. Counsel, Lincare, Inc. (Jan. 28, 2014)[hereinafter Notice of Proposed Determination, Lincare], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/
files/Lincare NPD-remediated.pdf (providing an illustration of a NPD proposing to impose a
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followed by a notice of final determination ("NFD"), which notifies the
covered entity or business associate of HHS's final decision to impose a civil
money penalty together with information stating when and how the covered
entity or business associate shall pay the penalty.3 Under the current HIPAA
Rules, both settlement amounts and civil money penalties are paid directly by
the covered entity or business associate to HHS, not to the individuals harmed
by the HIPAA Rules violations. 84
In addition to its civil enforcement of the HIPAA Rules, HHS also refers
certain cases that are appropriate for criminal investigation, including those
cases involving the knowing disclosure or obtaining of PHI in violation of the
HIPAA Rules, to the federal Department ofJustice.85 As of this writing, HHS
has referred 688 cases to the DOJ for criminal investigation.86
III. RESEARCH FINDINGS
A. NUMBER OFAFFECTED INDIVIDUALS IN CASES SELECTED FOR SETTLEMENT
OR PENALTY
HHS makes public some information regarding its intake, investigation,
and civil enforcement activities. This information includes the total number
$239,800 civil money penalty on covered entity Lincare); infra Appendix B (linking, in the far
right column, to all of the NPDs sent by HHS to covered entities through the end of calendar
year 2017).
83. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.424 (authorizing the Secretary of HHS to make final determinations
regarding penalties through a notice of final determination ("NFD")); Notice of Final
Determination fromJocelyn Samuels, Dir., Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
to Marshall S. Ney, Attorney, Friday, Eldredge & Clark, LLP (Mar. 1, 2o16) [hereinafter Notice
of Final Determination, Lincare], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/lincare-nfd-for-web.pdf
(providing an illustration of an NFD stating a March 1, 2016, civil money penalty imposition
date); infra Appendix B (linking, in the far right column, to all of the NFDs sent by HHS to
covered entities through the end of calendar year 2017).
84. See, e.g., Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr. Inc. (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. May 8, 2017) (requiring St.
Luke's to pay a settlement amount (also called a resolution amount) of $387,200 to HHS);
45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (providing that civil money penalties for HIPAA Rules violations are paid
to the Secretary of HHS). However, Part IV discusses long overdue federal regulations that would
allow individuals harmed by HIPAA Rules violations to receive a percentage of such civil money
penalties. See infra Part 1V.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 132od-6(a) to (b) (2012) (providing that "[a] person who knowingly
and in violation of' the HIPAA Rules uses, obtains, or discloses individually identifiable health
information shall be punished in accordance with a three-tiered criminal penalty scheme that
includes: (i) fines of not more than $50,000, imprisonment for not more than i year, or both;
(2) for offenses committed under false pretenses, fines of not more than $1oo,ooo,
imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both; and (3) "if the offense is committed with intent
to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health information for commercial advantage,
personal gain, or malicious harm," fines of not more than $250,000, imprisonment for not more
than 1o years, or both); HHS, Enforcement Highlights, supra note 13 (stating that OCR has made
688 referrals to the Department ofJustice).
86. See HHS, Enforcement Highlights, supra note 13 (stating the number of cases referred to
the DOJ).
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of HIPAA complaints HHS receives,87 the total number of notifications to
HHS by covered entities and business associates of breaches affecting 500 or
more individuals that have been resolved by HHS,88 the total number of
notifications to HHS of breaches affecting 500 or more individuals that are
currently under investigation by HHS,9 the number of complaints HHS has
resolved,o illustrative examples of corrective action taken by some covered
entities and business associates,, the content of all settlement agreements
entered into by HHS,o the content of all proposed and final civil money
penalty determinations made by HHS,93 and other data, such as the number
of complaints received by HHS (organized by year),94 the number of cases
enforced by HHS (organized by year),95 and the number of cases enforced by
HHS (organized by state of origin). 96
87. See id. (stating that the OCR has, as ofJune 30, 2018, "received over 184,614 HIPAA
complaints").
88. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Breach Portal: Notice to the
Secretary ofHHS Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information-Archive, HHS.cov, https://ocrportal.
hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach-reportjsf (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) (listing 1,974 resolved breach
notifications affecting 500 or more individuals as ofAugust I, 2018).
89. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Breach Portal: Notice to the
Secretary of IIHS Breach of Unsecured Protected Health Information-Cases Currently Under Investigation,
HHS.Gov, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach-reportjsf (last visited Nov. 18, 2018)
(listing 419 breach notifications affecting 500 or more individuals that are currently under
investigation by HHS as ofAugust 1, 2018).
90. See HHS, Enforcement Highlights, supra note 13 ("We have resolved ninety-six percent of
these cases (177,194)-" )-
91. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., All Case Examples, HHS.GOV
[hereinafter HHS, All Case Examples], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/examples/all-cases/index.html (last reviewed June 7, 2017) (providing 32
illustrative examples of cases in which HHS obtained corrective action from a covered entity or
business associate).
92. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Resolution Agreements, HHS.GOV
[hereinafter HHS, Resolution. Agreements], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/agreements/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 15, 2018) (linking the public to press
releases announcing the settlement agreements); infra Appendix A (referencing, summarizing,
and linking to the settlement agreements).
93. See HHS, Resolution Agreements, supra note 92 (linking the public to press releases
announcing the civil money penalty cases); infra Appendix B (referencing, summarizing, and
linking to the civil money penalty cases).
94. See Office for C.R, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Health Information Privacy
Complaints Received by Calendar Year, HHS.Gov, https://web.archive.org/web/2o' 1o6291424
3 6 /https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliancefnforcement/data/complaint-received-
by-calendar-year/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 13, 2016).
95. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Enforcement Results by Year
-Compliance Reviewvs, HHS.Gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/data/results-by-year-compliance-reviews/index.html (last reviewedJune 7, 2017).
96. See Office for CR., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Enforcement Results by State,
HHS.cov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/data/
enforcement-results-by-state/index.html (last reviewed Oct. 13, 2016).
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Let us begin by focusing on the complaints filed by individuals with HHS
to see the usefulness, from an individual's perspective, of filing a complaint
with the federal government. As background, individual patients and insureds
whose privacy and security rights have been violated frequently contact me at
my law office to ask whether and how to file a complaint with HHS. These
individuals may have heard that HHS imposes settlement amounts and civil
money penalties on noncompliant covered entities and business associates
and may wish to pursue that avenue of redress. These individuals frequently
ask me what they should expect as a result of filing such a complaint.
Between April 14, 2003 (the compliance date for the HIPAA Privacy
Rule) andJune 30, 2018 (the most recent date as of the writing of this Article
through which HHS has made complaint data available), HHS received
184,614 complaints alleging violations of the HIPAA Rules.97 Of these
184,614 complaints, HHS states that it has resolved 177,194 complaints
through: (1) a finding of a lack of jurisdiction by HHS, an untimely
complaint, or a description of an activity that, even if true, does not violate
the HIPAA Rules (11,179);9' (2) an investigation that led to a change in
privacy practices, the imposition of corrective action, and/or the provision of
technical assistance to the offending covered entity or business associate
(26,071, including the 52 settlement agreements and four civil money
penalties cases);99 (3) an investigation that led to a finding of no violation of
the HIPAA Rules (1 1,494);00 or (4) an "early intervention" by HHS-not an
investigation-that led to the provision by HHS of technical assistance to the
covered entity or business associate (28,450).Io HHS does not provide any
information regarding the complaints that it has received but not yet
processed or resolved (7,420).-o`
Because my clients frequently ask me about the possibility that HHS will
investigate and impose a settlement amount or civil money penalty on the
entity that violated their rights, let us focus for a moment on the 26,071 cases
in which HHS conducted an investigation that led to a change in privacy
practices, the imposition of corrective action (including a settlement plus
CAP or a civil money penalty), and/or the provision of technical assistance to
the covered entity or business associate.os How many of the settlement and
97. See HHS, Enforcement Highlights, supra note 13.
98. See id.
99. See id. (providing these numbers; stating that, "[c]orrective actions obtained by OCRfrom
these entities have resulted in change that is systemic and that affects all the individuals they serve").
100. See id. (providing these numbers).
101. See id. (presenting this information).
102. See id. (providing no information regarding the 7,420 [184,614 minus 177,194] complaints
HHS received between April 14, 2oo3, andJune 30, 2018, but that HHS has yet to resolve).
103. See id. ("OCR has investigated and resolved over 26,07 1 cases by requiring changes in
privacy practices and corrective actions by, or providing technical assistance to, HIPAA covered
entities and their business associates.").
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penalty cases involved just one individual, like each of my clients, who has
been harmed by a privacy or security violation?
1. HHS Settlement Agreements
Appendix A to this Article catalogues the 52 settlement agreements and
CAPS entered into by HHS with covered entities for violations of the HIPAA
Rules through August 1, 2018.04 Forty-eight (92.3%) of the 52 cases selected
for settlement by HHS involved a group-and many times a very large
group-of patients and insureds whose privacy or security rights were
potentially violated in the same incident or series of incidents.os For example,
HHS settled with 21st Century Oncology, Inc. ("21st Century") for $2.3
million in December 2017 after 21st Century likely violated the HIPAA
Privacy Rule. 21st Century had "disclos[ed] the names, social security
numbers, physicians' names, diagnoses, and treatment and insurance
information of 2,213,597" patients without their prior written authorization,
as required by the third rule within the Use and Disclosure Requirements. o
The 21st Century case clearly involved the PHI of a large group of patients;
that is, a group numbering over 2,000,000.
Likewise, HHS settled with Advocate Health Care Network for $5.5
million inJuly 2016, following a series of incidents in which Advocate had the
104. See infra Appendix A.
105. See infra Appendix A (listing 41 cases involving a group of individuals as identified by
the exact number of individuals affected (e.g., " 192" or "1,023,209") or by a number range of
individuals affected (e.g., ">386,ooo," "[o]ver i,ooo," or "[m]illions"); listing three cases in which
HHS used a phrase, such as "[n]umerous individuals" or "[m]any patients" that indicated that a
group of individuals had been affected; and listing four cases, indicated by the symbol t in the
third column, with respect to which HHS does not identify the exact number or range of
individuals who were affected and does not use a phrase such as "[n]umerous individuals" or
"[m]any patients"; however, by HHS's description of the nature of the incident, it is reasonable
to assume that the incident affected many individuals). A case in which it is reasonable to assume
that the incident affected many individuals is described by HHS as follows:
OCR ... opened its investigation of Rite Aid after television media videotaped
incidents in which pharmacies were shown to have disposed of prescriptions and
labeled pill bottles containing individuals' identifiable information in industrial
trash containers that were accessible to the public. These incidents were reported as
occurring in a variety of cities across the United States. Rite Aid pharmacy stores in
several of the cities were highlighted in media reports.
See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Rite Aid Agrees to Pay $i Million to Settle
IIIPAA Privacy Case, HHS.Gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/examples/rite-aid/index.html (last reviewedJune 7, 2017).
io6. See infra Appendix A, at row 50, col. 5 (summarizing the reasons for the settlement
agreement with 2 ist Century); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Failure
to Protect the Health Records of Millions of Persons Costs Entity Millions of Dollars (Dec. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter 21st Century Press Release], available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/12/
28/failure-to-protect-the-health-records-of-millions-of-persons-costsentity-millions-of-dollas.htm
("[21st Century] determined that 2,213,597 individuals were affected by the impermissible
access to their names, social security numbers, physicians' names, diagnoses, treatment, and
insurance information.").
2o0g] 1377
IOWA LAWREVIEW
ePHI of nearly 4,000,000 patients stolen or accessed without the patients'
prior written authorization.107 By final illustrative example, HHS settled with
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee for $1.5 million in March 2012 after
the insurer failed to secure and had stolen 57 unencrypted hard drives
containing the PHI of 1,023,209 insureds.,os
Only four (7.69%) of the 52 cases selected by HHS for settlement
involved one or two individuals. HHS may have selected these cases because
they involved intentional and egregious violations of the HIPAA Rules by
senior leadership or because they involved the unauthorized disclosure of
extremely sensitive PHI, such as HIV diagnoses.
In the first case involving the unauthorized disclosure of PHI of only one
or two individuals,09 HHS settled with Shasta Regional Medical Center for
$275,000 inJune 2013-`o The settlement occurred after senior leadership at
Shasta met with various media outlets and sent an email to the entire Shasta
workforce discussing the health care provided to one identifiable patient
without the patient's prior written authorization."' In the second case, HHS
settled with NewYork and Presbyterian Hospital ("Hospital") for $2.2 million
in April 2016, after the Hospital allowed a television film crew to film one
identifiable patient who was dying and a second identifiable patient who was
in significant distress, even after a medical professional urged the crew to stop
filming. 2 The Hospital failed to obtain the prior written authorization of the
107. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Advocate Health Care Settles
Potential HIPAA Penalties for $5.55 Million (Aug. 4, 2016), available at https://wayback.archive-
itorg/392 6 /2017012719212 7 /https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/201 6/o8/o 4 /advocate-health-
care-settles-potential-hipaa-penalties-555-million.htm ("The combined breaches affected the ePHI
of approximately 4 million individuals."); see infra Appendix A, at row 38, col. 5 (summarizing
the reasons for the settlement agreement with Advocate Health Care Network).
1 o8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., HHS Settles HIPAA Case with
BCBST for $1.5 Million (Mar. 13, 2012), available at https://wayback.archive-it.org/392
6 /
201501211 5 5 5 24 /http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/03/2012031 3 a.html ("The [stolen
hard] drives contained the [PHI] of over s million individuals, including member names, social
security numbers, diagnosis codes, dates of birth, and health plan identification numbers."); infra
Appendix A, at row 7, col. 5 (summarizing the reasons for the settlement agreement with the insurer).
og. See infra Appendix A (listing two cases involving one individual and two cases involving
two individuals).
i10. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HHS Requires California Medical
Center to Protect Patients' Right to Privacy (June 13, 2013), available at https://www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/agreements/srm c/press-release/index.html.
sI. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and Shasta
Reg'1 Med. Ctr. 1-2 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. June 6, 2013) [hereinafter Resolution
Agreement, Shasta Reg'l], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/
examples/shasta-agreement.pdf (discussing the facts that gave rise to the settlement with Shasta
Regional Medical Center).
1 12. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and N.Y.
& Presbyterian Hosp., at i (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/nyp-nymed-racap-april-2 016.pdf (describing the case's factual background);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Unauthorized Filming for "NY Med" Results
in $2.2 Million Settlement with New York Presbyterian Hospital (Apr. 21, 2016) [hereinafter NY
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two patients, as required by the third rule of the Use and Disclosure
Requirements., 3
In the third case involving the PHI of only one or two individuals, HHS
settled with Houston-based Memorial Hermann Health System ("Memorial
Hermann") for $2.4 million in April 2017 after senior leadership at Memorial
Hermann impermissibly disclosed one identifiable patient's PHI to several
media outlets and placed that same patient's PHI on Memorial Hermann's
website, all without the patient's prior written authorization. ' s In the fourth
and final case involving the PHI of only one or two individuals, HHS settled
with St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center Inc. for $387,200 in May 2017 after
a St. Luke's employee faxed, without prior written authorization, the sensitive
PHI of one patient to the patient's employer and the PHI of a second patient
to the second patient's place of volunteer work."5 The sensitive PHI included
information about the two patients' HIV status as well as their sexually
transmitted diseases, sexual orientation, mental health, and physical abuse." 6
2. HHS Civil Money Penalties
The cases discussed in the section above were settled by HHS and the
named covered entity through a settlement agreement plus a corrective
action plan, or CAP. According to the former Acting Deputy Director of
HHS's Office for Civil Rights, HHS "is prepared to take all of its cases to an
[administrative law judge ("ALJ")] for [the imposition of] a civil money
Med Press Release], available at http://wayback.archive-it.org/ 3 9 26/2o 70128230744/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2016/04/21 /unauthorized-filming-ny-med-results-22-million-
settlement-new-york-presbyterian-hospital.html ("[OCR] announced that it has reached a $2.2
million settlement with [NYP] for the egregious disclosure of two patients' [PHI] to film crews
and staff during the filming of 'NY Med,' an ABC television series, without first obtaining
authorization from the patients. In particular, OCR found that NYP allowed the ABC crew to film
someone who was dying and another person in significant distress, even after a medical
professional urged the crew to stop."); infra Appendix A, at row 34, col. 5 (summarizing the
reasons for the settlement agreement with New York and Presbyterian Hospital).
113. See supra note 112 (explaining that the two patients had not authorized filming).
114. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Texas Health System Settles
Potential HIPAA Disclosure Violations (May 10, 2017) [hereinafter Texas Health Press Release],
available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/ 2017/05/10/texas-health-system-settles-potential-
hipaa-disclosure-violations.html (quoting OCR Director Roger Severino stating "Senior management
should have known that disclosing a patient's name on the title of a press release was a clear
HIPAA Privacy violation that would induce a swift OCR response"); infra Appendix A, at row 48,
col- 5 (summarizing the reasons for the settlement agreement with Memorial Hermann).
115. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr. Inc., at i (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. May 8, 2017) [hereinafter
Resolution Agreement, St. Luke's-Roosevelt], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/st-lukes-
signed-ra-cap.pdf (describing the facts that gave rise to the settlement); Press Release, U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Serv., Careless Handling of HIV Information Jeopardizes Patient's Privacy,
Costs Entity $ 3 8 7 k (May 23, 2017), available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/201 7 /
05/23/careless-handling-hiv-information-costsentity.html; infra Appendix A, at row 49, col. 5(summarizing the reasons for the settlement agreement with St. Luke's).
116. Seesupranote 115-
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penalty." 7 However, HHS prefers settlements, which allow HHS to require
the covered entity or business associate to enter into a CAP, mandating
corrections and prospective HIPAA compliance." 8 On the other hand, in civil
money penalty cases, HHS does not have authority to obtain injunctive relief
or to impose corrective action.-9 Settlements also offer non-compliant
covered entities and business associates significant savings compared to civil
money penalties.120 Settlement amounts typically range from ten to 70% of
the dollar amount HHS could impose if the case went to an ALJ for a civil
money penalty.''
Despite HHS's preference for settlements in this context, Appendix B to
this Article catalogues the four cases in which HHS imposed a civil money
penalty for violations of the HIPAA Rules through August 1, 2018.22 In these
four cases, HHS was unable to obtain voluntary compliance or agreement
regarding past non-compliant behavior and/or future compliance. The third
column of Appendix B shows the number of individuals affected by each
privacy or security violation that led to the civil money penalty. 23 All four, or
ioo%, of the civil money penalty cases involved groups of patients, rather than
individuals.124
In the first civil money penalty case, HHS imposed a $4,351 ,6oo penalty
on Cignet Health Care in February 201 1 after Cignet failed to give a group of
41 patients copies of their requested medical records. 25 In the second case,
HHS imposed a $239,800 penalty on Lincare, Inc. in March 2016 after a
Lincare employee left the PHI of a group of 278 patients under a bed and in
a kitchen drawer after the employee moved out of the home she shared with
another person. 6 In the third case, HHS imposed a $3,217,000 fine on
117. The Intersection of OCR Enforcnent and Health Care Data Privacy & Security (Polsinelli Health
Care Webinar Series Mar. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Polsinelli Webinar], https://www.polsinelli.com/
intelligence/webinar-the-intersection-of-ocrenforcement (featuring recorded statements made by
Iliana Peters, the former Acting Deputy Director of HHS's Office for Civil Rights, regarding
settlements versus civil money penalties).
118. Id.
ig. Id,
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See infra Appendix B.
123. See infra Appendix B, at col. 3.
124. See infra Appendix B (listing groups consisting of 41, 278, "at least" 2484, and approximately
33,500 individuals).
125. See Notice of Proposed Determination, Cignet, supra note 9, at i (summarizing the
case); id. at Attachment A (noting that Cignet failed to provide 41 patients access to their medical
records starting in November 2008 and proceeding throughout 2009); infra Appendix B, at row 1
(cataloguing the Cignet civil money penalty case).
126. See Notice of Final Determination, Lincare, supra note 83, at i (summarizing the case);
Notice of Proposed Determination, Lincare, supra note 82, at 2,1 5 (noting that the complainant
stated that he found PHI of 278 patients "under a bed and in a kitchen drawer in approximately
November 2oo8"); infraAppendix B, at row 2 (cataloguing the Lincare civil money penalty case).
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Children's Medical Center of Dallas in January 2017 following several
incidents involving the loss or theft of unencrypted devices containing the
ePHI of at least 2,484 individuals.127 In the fourth case, HHS imposed a
$4,348,ooo fine on the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center in
June 2018 following an investigation into three data breaches involving one
stolen laptop and two lost flash drives (all unencrypted) that compromised
the identifiable health information of more than 33,500 individuals. 28 Again,
all four cases selected by HHS for the imposition of civil money penalties
involved the PHI of groups of patients, not individuals.
3. State Attorney General Enforcement
In addition to civil enforcement by HHS, a state attorney general also has
the authority under HITECH to bring a civil action seeking damages or an
injunction on behalf of a state resident for violations of the HIPAA Rules.'29
Appendix C to this Article catalogues the 15 HIPAA Rules cases brought by
seven attorneys general out of Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, NewJersey, New York, and Vermont through August 1, 2018.30
The fourth column of Appendix C shows the number of individuals affected
by each privacy or security incident that led to the state enforcement action.
All 15 (ioo%) of the cases brought by state attorneys general involved groups
of patients and insureds, rather than individuals, who were affected by
violations of the HIPAA Rules.'s
The Connecticut Attorney General brought the first state action
enforcing the HIPAA Rules in July 2010.32 In that action, Health Net, Inc.
127. SeeNotice of Final Determination from Jocelyn Samuels, Dir., Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't
of Health & Human Servs., to David Berry, President, Sys. Clinical Operations, Children's Med.
Ctr. i (Jan. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Notice of Final Determination, Children's Med. Ctr.],
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/childrens-notice-of-final-determination.pdf (imposing the
penalty on Children's Medical Center of Dallas); Notice of Proposed Determination from Marisa
M. Smith, Reg'l Manager, Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to David Berry,
President, Sys. Clinical Operations, Children's Med. Ctr. 6 (Sept. 30, 2o16) [hereinafter Notice
of Proposed Determination, Children's Med. Ctr.], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
childrens-notice-of-proposed-determination.pdf (describing the HIPAA Rules violations that led
to the penalty; stating in relevant part that "Children's impermissibly disclosed the PHI of at least
2,484 individuals"); infra Appendix B, at row 3 (cataloguing the Children's Medical Center of
Dallas civil money penalty case).
1 28. See Dir. of the Office for C.R. v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., Docket No. C-
17-854, Decision No. CR5 t 1, at 1-2, 4-5 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. June 1, 2018);
infra Appendix B, at row 4 (cataloguing MD Anderson's civil money penalty case).
129. See42 U.S.C. § 13 2od- 5 (d) (2012) (authorizing a state attorney general to bring a civil
action or an injunction on behalf of residents of that state for violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
130. See infra Appendix C.
131. See infra Appendix C, at col. 4 (listing groups consisting of 500,000, 525, 8oo,ooo,
>23,000, 67,000, 12,127, 3,796, >5,6oo, 2,159, 3,403, "Multiple 'patients' and 'consumers,'"
69o,ooo, 2,460, 81,122, and >1,650 persons).
132. See Press Release, Conn. Attorney Gen.'s Office, Attorney General Announces Health
Net Settlement Involving Massive Security Breach Compromising Private Medical and Financial
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("Health Net") entered into a $250,000 settlement agreement with the
Connecticut Attorney General following Health Net's loss of a hard drive
containing the PHI of 1.5 million insureds total, including 5 00,000
Connecticut residents.133 The Vermont Attorney General brought the second
state action enforcing the HIPAA Rules in January 2011, also against Health
Net.134 In the Vermont action, Health Net agreed to pay the Vermont
Attorney General an additional $55,ooo because the lost hard drive contained
the PHI of 525 Vermont residents. 35 In a third illustrative example of a state
enforcement action involving the PHI of a group of patients, rather than the
PHI of just one individual, South Shore Hospital paid the Massachusetts
Attorney General $750,000 in May 2012 after the "[h]ospital shipped three
boxes [holding] 473 unencrypted back-up computer tapes" that contained
the PHI of 8oo,ooo patients.'3 6 Only one box made it to its final destination
in Texas.137
In summary, HHS and state attorneys general focus their settlement and
penalty efforts on cases involving groups-many times large groups-of
patients and insureds, leaving individuals whose privacy and security rights
have been violated out of the enforcement spotlight. In particular, 48
(92.3%) of the 52 HIPAA Rules cases selected by HHS for settlement involved
the PHI of groups, rather than individuals. 38 All four (ioo%) of the four civil
money penalty cases involved the PHI of groups, rather than individuals.139
Info (July 6, 20o), available at https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Press-Releases-Archived/20lo-Press-
Releases/Attorney-General-Announces-Health-Net-Settlement-Involving-Massive-Security-Breach-
Compromising-Priv ("Attorney General Richard Blumenthal today announced a settlement-the
first of its kind in the nation-with Health Net and its affiliates for failing to secure private patient
medical records and financial information on nearly a half million Connecticut enrollees and
promptly notify consumers endangered by the breach.").
133. See id. ("The settlement provides powerful protections for consumers and a $250,000
payment to the state-and marks the first action by a state attorney general for violations of
... (HIPAA) since ... (HITECH) authorized state attorneys general to enforce HIPAA.").
134. See Press Release, Vt. Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Settles Security
Breach Allegations Against Health Insurer (Jan. 18, 201 1) (on file with author).
135. See id. ("The case arises from a portable hard drive that contained protected health
information, social security numbers, and financial information of approximately 1.5 million
people, including 525 Vermonters.").
136. SeePress Release, Attorney Gen. of Mass., South Shore Hospital to Pay $750,000 to Settle
Data Breach Allegations (May 24, 2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/ 201 2/201 2-5-24-south-shore-hospital-data-breach-settlement.hm ("In
February 2oo, South Shore Hospital shipped three boxes containing 473 unencrypted back-up
computer tapes with 8oo,ooo individuals' personal information and protected health
information off-site to be erased.... InJune 2010 South Shore Hospital learned that only one of
the boxes arrived at its destination in Texas.").
137. See id.
138. See infra Appendix A (assuming that the cases in which "[n]either the Resolution
agreement nor the press release released by HHS state the exact number of individuals affected"
involved many individuals, rather than one or two people).
139. See infra Appendix B.
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And, all 15 (1 oo%) of the 15 HIPAA Rules cases selected by state attorneys
general for enforcement involved the PHI of groups, rather than
individuals. 4o These trends were apparent in my own law practice. Using the
HHS complaint portal, 4' I have assisted dozens of individual patients and
insureds with the filing of timely, valid complaints against covered entities.
These complaints contained direct, written, photographic, and sometimes
even video evidence of intentional, flagrant, and repeated violations of the
HIPAA Rules. Not one of my individual clients' complaints resulted in a
settlement or penalty.
4. HHS Corrective Action in Non-Settlement and Non-Penalty Cases
In addition to the full text of its settlement agreements and proposed and
final civil money penalty determinations, HHS also provides the public with
32 examples of investigated cases not selected for settlement or penalty that
involve HIPAA Rules violations.42 Twenty-five (78%) of these examples
involve the PHI of one patient (or one patient plus one family member of that
patient), whereas only six (18.75%) of the examples involve the PHI of groups
of patients or insureds.'4s It appears, then, from the 32 examples of corrective
action publicized by HHS on its website, that privacy and security violations
involving one person's PHI are steered towards corrective action without
settlement or penalty whereas violations involving the PHI of groups of
patients and insureds may be steered towards settlement or penalty.
HHS's selection of cases involving the PHI of groups for settlement or
penalty makes sense considering the agency's own regulations, which list
factors to be considered by HHS in determining the amount of a civil money
penalty.'++ "The number of individuals affected" by the violation is the first
factor, among more than a dozen factors, to be considered by HHS in
determining the amount of the penalty."is Mathematically, privacy and
security violations involving the PHI of large numbers of patients and insureds
140. See infra Appendix C.
141. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Complaint Portal-File a
Health Information Privacy Complaint, HHS.Gov, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/cp/wizard-cpjsf
(last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
142. See HHS, All Case Examples, supra note 91 (providing 32 illustrative examples of cases in
which HHS obtained corrective action from a covered entity or business associate).
143. See id. (indicating that the first through eighth, i 3 th, 14 th through 22nd, 2 4 th through
28th, 3oth, and 31st examples involve the PHI of only one patient or a patient and one family
member; whereas the ninth, is th, 12th, 23rd, 29th, and 32nd examples involve the PHI of
groups of patients or insureds. The tenth example is unclear in terms of whether it involves the
PHI of an individual or a group of persons).
144. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.408 (2017) (titled "Factors considered in determining the amount
of a civil money penalty.").
145. See id. § 16o-4o8(a)(i) ("In determining the amount of any civil money penalty, the
Secretary will consider the following factors, which may be mitigating or aggravating as
appropriate: . . . [t]he number of individuals affected. . . .").
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will yield higher penalties, as well as higher settlement amounts, for HHS
compared to violations involving the PHI of a single person. The catch is that
individuals whose privacy and security rights have been intentionally, and
many times flagrantly and repeatedly, violated by covered entities and
business associates are unlikely to see their offenders penalized in the same
way that groups are. That is, they are unlikely to experience the same sense of
civil justice associated with the imposition of a settlement payment or
monetary penalty. Perhaps HHS believes that the corrective action required
by HHS in the cases not selected for settlement or penalty serves the same
purpose. As discussed in Section III.B. 3 below, however, the majority of
examples of corrective action provided by HHS are prospective in nature.
Prospective action does safeguard future rights, but it does little to remedy
past harms.
B. TIMELINESS ANI NATURE OFEAiORCEMENT
1. HHS Settlement Agreements
With respect to the 26,071 investigated cases in which HHS required a
covered entity to change its privacy practices or take other corrective action,
HHS provides no information stating how long it took each of the covered
entities or business associates to change its practices or take the required
action. However, in 52 of those 26,071 cases (i.e., the 52 cases in which HHS
imposed a settlement amount and corrective action plan ("CAP") on the
covered entity for potential violations of the HIPAA Rules), the length of time
can be estimated from the full text of the publicly available settlement
agreement and CAP.
To illustrate the length of time it can take HHS to enter into a settlement
agreement, which can include settlement amounts as low as $25,000146 and as
high as $5.55 million,17 and to illustrate the length of time it can take for the
covered entity's corrective action obligations to begin, this Article will analyze
the first, tenth, 2oth, 3oth, 4oth, and 5 oth settlements agreements set forth
at Appendix A to this Article. As described in detail below, these time frames
range from more than two years to more than five years.
HHS entered into its first-ever resolution agreement and CAP with
Seattle-based Providence Health & Services ("Providence") onJuly 15, 2oo8,
approximately two and one-third years after the first privacy incident, dated
September 29, 2005, that gave rise to HHS's investigation of Providence in
146. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and Complete
P.T., Pool & Land Physical Therapy, Inc., at 2, ¶ 6 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Feb. 2, 2016),
[hereinafter Resolution Agreement, Complete PT], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
cpt-res-agreement.pdf (setting forth a resolution amount of $25,000).
147. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and Advocate
Health Care Network, at 3, 1 6 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. July 8, 2016),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/Advocate-racap.pdf (setting forth a resolution amount
of $5.55 million).
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the first place.48 Providence's CAP required Providence to revise its privacy
policies and procedures, re-train its workforce members on those revised
policies and procedures, and monitor its workforce's familiarity and
compliance with the revised policies and procedures.'is The CAP did not
become effective until, at the earliest, go days after the CAP's execution date
of July 15, 2008.o50 Approximately two and two-third years elapsed between
the date of the first privacy incident that gave rise to HHS's investigation of
Providence and the date of Providence's actual corrective action.'s5
HHS entered into its tenth resolution agreement and CAP with
Massachusetts Eye and Ear Infirmary ("MEEI") on September 13, 2012,
approximately two and one-third years after MEEI notified HHS of the breach
that gave rise to HHS's investigation of MEEI.'s' The CAP, which required
MEEI to revise its privacy and policies and procedures, train its workforce
members on the revised policies and procedures, and monitor its workforce's
familiarity and compliance with the revised policies and procedures, did not
become effective until, at the earliest, go days after the CAP's execution date
of September 13, 2012.53 Approximately two and two thirds of a year elapsed
between the date of the first privacy incident that gave rise to HHS's
investigation of MEEI to the date of MEEI's actual corrective action.
HHS entered into its 20th resolution agreement and CAP with New York
and Presbyterian Hospital ("NYP") on May 7, 2014, approximately three years
and six months after NYP notified HHS of the breach that gave rise to HHS's
148. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and
Providence Health & Servs., at so (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs.July 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Resolution Agreement, Providence], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/
enforcement/examples/agreement.pdf (setting forth a full execution date of July 15, 2008);
id. at i (noting that "laptops containing ePHI were left unattended and were stolen from
[workforce] members of [Providence Health & Services]" on September 29, 2005); infra
Appendix A, at row I (cataloguing HHS's settlement agreement with Providence).
149. See Resolution Agreement, Providence, supra note 148, app. A, at 3-8 (listing
Providence's corrective action obligations); id. app. A, at 4 (requiring Providence, for example,
to provide HHS with HIPAA-compliant policies and procedures within ninety days of the CAP's
execution date).
150. See id. at 3-4.
151. See id. at 3-4; id. app. A, at 4 .
152. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and Mass. Eye
& Ear Infirmary, at i (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Sept. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Resolution
Agreement, MEEI], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/
examples/meei-agreement-pdf.pdf (noting that HHS received MEEI's breach notification on April
20, 2010); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Massachusetts Provider Settles
HIPAA Case for $1-5 Million (Sept. 17, 2012), available at https://wayback.archive-it.org/ 3 9 26/
20150121155313/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2os2pres/0 9 /201o917a.html (noting a
September 27, 2012, press release date); infra Appendix A, at row to (cataloguing HHS's
settlement agreement with MEEI).
153. See Resolution Agreement, MEEI, supra note 152, app. A, at A-3 to A-8 (listing MEEI's
corrective action obligations); id. app. A, at A-6 (requiring, for example, MEEI to designate a
monitor within 90 days of the effective date of the CAP).
2019] 1385
IOWA LAWREVIEW
investigation of NYP.54 The CAP required NYP to "[d]evelop and
[i]mplement a [r]isk [m]anagement [p]lan," "[r]eview and [r]evise [its]
[p]olicies and [p]rocedures on [i]nformation [a]ccess [m]anagement,"
"[i]mplement [new] [p]rocess[es] for [elvaluating [e]nvironmental and
[o]perational [c]hanges," and "[d]evelop an [e]nhanced [p]rivacy and
[s]ecurity [a]wareness [t]raining [p1rogram," among other requirements.'55
The corrective action obligations set forth in the CAP did not become
effective until, at the earliest, go days after the CAP's execution date of
May 7, 2014. 56 Approximately four years elapsed between the date of NYP's
notification to HHS of NYP's breach and the date of NYP's actual corrective
action.
HHS entered into its 3 oth resolution agreement and CAP with Complete
P.T., Pool and Land Physical Therapy, Inc. ("Complete PT") on February 2,
2016, approximately three years and five months after HHS received the
complaint that gave rise to HHS's investigation of Complete PT.: 7 The CAP
required Complete PT to remove patients' PHI from its public website,
develop HIPAA-compliant privacy policies and procedures and distribute
those policies and procedures to its workforce members, and train workforce
members on such policies and procedures.158 These corrective action
obligations, including the obligation to remove patient PHI from Complete
PT's website, did not become effective until, at the earliest, ten days after the
CAP's execution date of February 2, 2016, or three and one-half years after
HHS received the complaint giving rise to its investigation of Complete PT.'59
154. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and the New
York & Presbyterian Hosp., at i (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. May 2014) [hereinafter
Resolution Agreement, NYP 2014], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/
hipaa/enforcement/examples/ny-and-presbyterian-hospital-setdement-agreement.pdf (noting
that NYP notified HHS ofa breach on September 27, 2oo); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Data Breach Results in $4.8 Million HIPAA Settlements (May 7, 2014)
[hereinafter NYP Press Release], available at http://wayback.archive-it.org/392
6 / 201 5o6 1819
oi 2 3 /http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/05/20140507b.html 
("[HHS] ... initiated
its investigation of [NYP] and Columbia University ... following their submission of ajoint breach
report, dated September 27, 2010. ); infra Appendix A, at row 20 (cataloguing HHS's
settlement agreement with NYP).
155. See Resolution Agreement, NYP 2014, supra note 154, app. A, at *2-7 (listing NYP's
corrective action obligations).
156. See id. at 2-3; id. app. A, at *3 (requiring, for example, NYP to review its information
access management policies and procedures within ninety days of the CAP's effective date).
157. See Resolution Agreement, Complete PT, supra note 146, at ii (showing an execution
date of February 2, 2016); id. at i (noting that HHS received a complaint regarding Complete
PT on August 8, 2012); infra Appendix A, at row 30 (cataloguing HHS's settlement agreement
with Complete PT).
i58. See Resolution Agreement, Complete PT, supra note 146, at 6-9 (listing Complete PT's
corrective action obligations and requiring Complete PT to remove PHI from its website within
ten days of the effective date of the CAP).
159. Id. at 9 (noting that the "[r]emoval of PHI from [Complete PT's] [w]ebsite" must occur
"[w]ithin so days of the [e]ffective [d]ate of [the Resolution] Agreement").
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HHS entered into its 4 oth resolution agreement and CAP with St. Joseph
Health ("SJH") on October 13, 2016, approximately four years and seven
months after SJH notified HHS of the breach that gave rise to HHS's
investigation of SJH.,oo The CAP required SJH to "[c]onduct an [e]nterprise-
wide [r]isk [a]nalysis," "[d]evelop and [i]mplement a [r]isk [m]anagement
[p]lan," revise its privacy policies and procedures, and train its workforce on
the revised policies and procedures.'"i The compliance date for these
corrective action obligations was, at the earliest, 24o days after the CAP's
effective date of October 13, 2016.162 Almost five and one-half years elapsed
between the date SJH notified HHS of its breach and SJH's actual corrective
action.
HHS entered into its both settlement agreement and CAP with 21st
Century Oncology, Inc. ("2 ist Century") on December 28, 2017,
approximately two years and two months after the first date (October 3, 2015)
an unauthorized hacker likely obtained PHI from 21st Century in violation of
the HIPAA Rules.' 6 3 Among other obligations, the CAP requires 21st Century
to "[clomplet[e] [a] [r]isk [a]nalysis and [r]isk [m]anagement [p]lan,"
revise its policies and procedures, and implement an internal monitoring
plan.' 64 These corrective action obligations do not become effective until, at
the earliest, 6o days after the CAP's execution date of December 28, 2017;
that is, the last day of February 2018.165 Approximately two years and four
months will have elapsed between the date of the security incident and the
date of 2 ist Century's actual corrective action.
In summary, the first, tenth, 20th, 3oth, 40th, and 5oth settlement
agreements entered into by HHS with covered entities for potential violations
of the HIPAA Rules show that covered entities are not required to correct
16o. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and St.Joseph
Health, at iI (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Serys. Oct. 13, 2016) [hereinafter Resolution
Agreement, SJH], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/signed-sjh-ra-and-cap.pdf (showing
an execution date of October 13, 2016); id. at i (noting that SJH reported the relevant breach
on February 14, 2012); infra Appendix A, at row 40 (cataloguing HHS's settlement agreement
with SJH).
161. Resolution Agreement, SJH, supra note 16o, at 6-8 (summarizing SJH's corrective
action obligations).
162. Id. at 6 (requiring SJH's "[e]nterprise-wide [r]isk [a]nalysis" to be performed and
submitted to HHS within 240 days of the effective date of the Resolution Agreement).
163. See Resolution Agreement between U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. and 21st
Century Oncology, Inc., at 1 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs. Dec. 2017) [hereinafter
Resolution Agreement, 2 I st Century Oncology], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/21 ICO-
ra.cap.pdf (referencing the October 3, 2015, unauthorized access date); 21st Century Press
Release, supra note io6 (showing a December 28, 2017, press release date); infra Appendix A, at
row 50 (cataloguing HHS's settlement agreement with 2 1St Century).
164. See Resolution Agreement, 21st Century Oncology, supra note 163, at 6-15 (listing the
corrective action obligations of 21st Century Oncology).
165. See id. at 9 (requiring 21st Century to select an independent assessor within 6o days of
the effective date of the CAP).
2o0g] 1387
IOWA LAWREVIEW
their problematic practices, policies, and procedures until, at the earliest,
approximately two and one-half years after the date of the first incident or the
breach notification that gave rise to HHS's investigation of the covered entity
in the first place. One covered entity (St. Joseph Health) had much longer
-approximately five and one-half years-to take corrective action. Clinical
issues raised by these time periods are discussed in the sub-section
immediately below.' 66
2. HHS Civil Money Penalties
In addition to its 52 settlement agreements, which resolve potential
violations of the HIPAA Rules, HHS also has imposed civil money penalties
on four covered entities following formal findings of non-compliance with the
HIPAA Rules and after attempts to obtain corrective action and/or settlement
failed.'67 Although the first civil money penalty case involving Cignet Health
Center took approximately two years and two months from the date of the
first HIPAA Rules violation to the date of penalty imposition, 68 the second,
third, and fourth civil money penalty cases took significantly longer to resolve.
In particular, HHS's imposition of a civil money penalty against Lincare, Inc.
took approximately seven years and four months from the date of the very
first privacy incident that gave rise to Lincare's investigation. 69 Similarly,
HHS's imposition of a civil money penalty against Children's Medical Center
of Dallas ("Children's") took approximately seven years and two months from
the date of the very first privacy incident that gave rise to HHS's investigation
of Children's.70 HHS's recent imposition of a civil money penalty against the
University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center ("MD Anderson") took
I66. See infra Section III.B.2.
167. See infra notes 168-71 (referencing the four civil money penalty cases, documented by
HHS in notices of final penalty determinations); infra Appendix B (cataloguing the four cases in
which HHS imposed a civil money penalty on a covered entity).
168. Notice of Final Determination, Cignet, supra note 9, at 1 (noting a February 4, 2011,
civil money penalty imposition date); Notice of Proposed Determination, Cignet, supra note 9, at
Attachment A (noting that Cignet failed to provide patients with access to their medical records
starting in November 2008 and proceeding throughout 2009).
169. Compare Notice of Final Determination, Lincare, supra note 83, at *2 (stating the civil
money penalty due date as "due upon Lincare's receipt of (the] Notice of Final Determination,"
which is dated March 1, 2016), with Notice of Proposed Determination, Lincare, supra note 82,
at 2 (noting that "the [c]omplainant stat[ed] that he found ... PHI under a bed and in a kitchen
drawer in approximately November 2oo8").
170. Compare Notice of Final Determination, Children's Med. Ctr., supra note 127, at 2
(stating that payment of funds is due "upon Children's receipt of [the] Notice of Final
Determination," which is dated January 18, 2017), with Notice of Proposed Determination,
Children's Med. Ctr., supra note 127, at 2 (noting that a workforce member of Children's Medical
Center's lost "an unencrypted, non-password protected BlackBerry device at the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport on November 19, 2009").
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approximately six years and one month from the date of the very first privacy
incident that gave rise to the government's investigation of MD Anderson. 17
Interestingly, HHS did not appear to obtain corrective action from any
of the four covered entities that paid civil money penalties to HHS for
violations of the HIPAA Rules. News reports state that Cignet, the first penalty
payor, actually refused to take corrective action and refused to cooperate with
HHS during the federal investigation. 172 It is not clear whether the 41 patients
who needed copies of their medical records from Cignet ever obtained them,
even after Cignet paid its multi-million-dollar penalty. Similarly, Lincare, the
second penalty payor, reportedly took "only minimal action to correct its
policies and strengthen safeguards to ensure compliance with the HIPAA
Rules," thus leading to its high penalty.173 Children's Medical Center, the
third penalty payor, also does not appear to have taken any corrective action.
Indeed, HHS's press release announcing the Children's penalty states,
"[a]lthough OCR prefers to settle cases and assist entities in implementing
corrective action plans, a lack of risk management . . . can also cost covered
entities a sizable fine."'74 The penalty payors' refusal or failure to completely
correct their problematic privacy practices is consistent with statements made
by former government regulators, who have explained that HHS does not
have injunction or corrective action authority in cases that result in a civil
money penalty.'75
171. Compare Dir. of the Office for Civil Rights v. Univ. of Tex. MD Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
Docket No. C-i7 -85 4 , Decision No. CR5 111 (U.S. Dep't Health & Human Servs.June 1, 2018)
(sustaining on June 1, 2018, the imposition of a civil money penalty on MD Anderson), with
Notice of Proposed Determination from Marisa M. Smith, Reg'1 Manager, Office for C.R., U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., to Scott McBride, Baker & Hostetler 3 (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/md-anderson-npd-signed.pdf (noting the theft of an
unencrypted laptop of a workforce member of MD Anderson on April 30, 2012).
172. See John Commins, Cignet Health Fined $4 -3 M for HIJPAA Violations, HEALTHLEADERS(Feb. 23, 2o 1), https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/innovation/cignet-health-fined-
4 3m-hipaa-violations ("The civil money penalty for the violations was $1.3 million. During the
investigations, however, Cignet allegedly ignored OCR's demands to produce the records. A
federal court issued a default judgment against Cignet on March 30, 2010. On April 7, 2010,
Cignet gave the medical records to OCR, allegedly with no efforts to resolve the complaints
through 'informal means.' OCR alleged that Cignet also failed to cooperate with the investigation
from March 17, 2oog, to April 7, 2010, indicating 'Cignet's willful neglect to comply with the
Privacy Rule.' The failure to cooperate with OCR added $3 million to the civil money payment,
HHS said.").
173. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Administrative LawJudge Rules in
Favor of OCR Enforcement, Requiring Lincare, Inc. to Pay $239,800 (Feb. 3, 2016), available at
http://wayback.archive-it.org/ 3 9 26/201701271 
8 5543/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/20 6/
02/o3/administrative-lawjudge-rules-favor-ocr-enforcement-requiring-lincare-inc-pay-penalties.html.
174. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Lack of Timely Action Risks
Security and Costs Money (Feb. 1, 2017), available at https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/20
7 /02/01 /lack-timely-action-risks-security-and-costs-money.html (quoting Robinsue Frohboese, OCR
Acting Director).
175. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing how in civil money penalty
cases HHS lacks authority to grant injunctions or impose corrective actions).
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A covered entity's violation of the HIPAA Rules, or refusal to take prompt
corrective action, can be clinically problematic. Consider a patient who needs
to see a specialist, such as an oncologist, because the cancer care the patient
needs is outside the expertise of the general practitioner ("GP") who has been
treating the patient. A delay by the GP in transferring or a refusal to transfer
the patient's medical record to the oncologist could lead to a delay in surgery,
chemotherapy, or radiation, which could result in the spread of the patient's
cancer and a reduced chance of survival for the patient.
Consider, by further example, a patient for whom a risky surgery is
recommended by one surgeon. The patient would be wise to obtain an
opinion from a second surgeon and, indeed, many public and private health
insurers will pay for that second opinion. 76 A delay by the first surgeon in
transferring or a refusal by the first surgeon to transfer the patient's medical
record to the surgeon who will provide the second opinion could result in the
patient not receiving the second opinion and possibly undergoing a risky and
medically unnecessary surgery, potentially leading to complications or death.
In summary, a covered entity's violation of an Individual Right or another
provision within the HIPAA Privacy Rule is not just a legal and ethical
problem, as is commonly thought.'77 The violation can also negatively impact
patient health, safety, and welfare. In addition, a covered entity that ultimately
takes corrective action imposed by HHS, even after a two-to-seven-year delay,
may be helping to ensure that future patients have exercisable rights.17
8
However, this Article argues that settlement agreements and CAPs that result
in delayed corrective action, or the imposition of a civil money penalty without
any corrective action, do nothing to remedy the past harm suffered by
individuals whose rights have already been violated.
3. HHS Corrective Action in Non-Settlement and Non-Penalty Cases
Remember that HHS has required changes in privacy practices or other
corrective action in 26,071 investigated cases in total, and that Appendices A
176. See, e.g., AETNA INC., Now INCLUDED IN YOUR HEALTH PLAN: A FIRST-RATE SECOND
OPINION 1 (2014), https://www.aetna.com/content/dam/aetna/pdfs/aetna-international/
memberkit/Flyer-Mem-Second-Opinion.pdf ("Your Aetna International health plan now enables
you to get a second opinion for some conditions and treatments at no additional cost."); Your
Medicare Coverage: Second Surgical Opinions, MEDICARE.COV, https://www.medicare.gov/coverage/
second-surgical-opinions (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) ("Medicare Part B ... covers a second
opinion in some cases for surgery that isn't an emergency. Medicare also will help pay for a third
opinion if the first and second opinions are different.").
177. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.102 (West 2017) (providing patients
with a legal right to access their electronic health records); CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: PRIVACY,
CONFIDENTIALITY & MEDICAL RECORDS Op. 3.3.1 (AM. MED. Ass'N 2016) ("[P]hysicians have an
ethical obligation to manage medical records appropriately. This obligation encompasses
... providing copies or transferring records to a third party as requested by the patient. . . .").
178. But see HHS, Enforcement Highlights, supra note 13 (stating that change resulting from
corrective action imposed by HHS "is systemic and ... affects all the individuals [the covered
entity] servels]").
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and B to this Article reference only 56 of these cases. 79 What happened in
the other 26,015 investigated cases? Did HHS make the covered entity take
corrective action within a day, or a week, or a month, of receiving a patient
complaint or a breach notification from the covered entity? Did this corrective
action actually remedy the harm suffered by the individual whose privacy or
security rights were violated?
HHS provides only brief summaries of 32 of these other 26,015 cases on
its website.so Although each case summary provides two or three examples of
the prospective corrective action required by HHS of the covered entity, not
one of the summaries states how long it took the covered entity to take the
required action. In addition, most of the summaries do not mention any
remedy for the harmed individual other than an acknowledgement that the
individual's rights had been violated and/or an apology to the patient. 8
For example, one of the case examples involved a hospital employee who
failed to adhere to an agreed-upon privacy restriction requested by a patient
in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.,82 In particular, the employee left
considerable PHI on the patient's home voicemail that was accessed by other
family members, in contravention of the patient's agreed-upon request to be
179. See infra Appendices A, B.
i8o. See HHS, All Case Examples, supra note 91 (providing 32 illustrative examples of cases in
which HHS obtained corrective action from a covered entity or business associate).
181. See, e.g., id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Mental Health Center
Corrects Process for Providing Notice of Privacy Practices," a case in which a covered entity failed
to provide a patient with the entity's notice of privacy practices; stating that "the mental health
center acknowledged that it had not provided the ... notice" of privacy practices as required;
making the covered entity "revise[] its intake .. . polic[ies] and procedures to specify that" future
patients will be provided notices of privacy practices and retrain its staff regarding those policies);
id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Private Practice Implements Safeguards
for Waiting Rooms," a case in which "[a] staff member of a [private clinic] discussed HIV testing
procedures with a patient in the waiting room, thereby disclosing" the patient's diagnosis to other
individuals in the waiting room; identifying several corrective action measures that would prevent
the unauthorized disclosure from occurring again, such as new policies and procedures designed
to safeguard PHI and the training of staff on those policies); id. (referring to the compliance
enforcement case titled "Radiologist Revises Process for Workers Compensation Disclosures," a
case in which an employee of a radiology practice sent a patient's test result to the patient's
employer without the patient's prior written authorization; requiring the radiology practice to
apologize to the patient and to sanction the employee who made the unauthorized disclosure;
also requiring the radiology practice to revise its policies and procedures); id. (referring to the
compliance enforcement case titled "Dentist Revises Process to Safeguard Medical Alert PHI," a
case in which a dental clinic placed a red HIV sticker on the outside of a medical record belonging
to a patient with HIV and noting that the sticker could be seen by staff and other patients;
requiring the dental clinic to adopt a new policy requiring the movement of all HIV stickers from
the outside to the inside of patients' medical records; requiring the dental clinic to apologize to
the patient in person and in writing).
182. Id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Hospital Implements New
Minimum Necessary Policies for Telephone Messages"); see45 C.F.R. § 164-522 (a) () (iii) (2017)
(requiring covered entities to adhere to agreed-upon restrictions).
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contacted only at work.'5 s In response, HHS required the covered entity to
develop new voicemail policies and procedures and to train staff members on
those new policies and procedures.5 84 The summary provided by HHS does
not indicate that the patient received any remedy for the violation of her
privacy rights.
A second illustrative corrective action case involved a "hospital [that]
released to the local media, without the patient's [prior written]
authorization, copies of the patient's skull x-ray as well as a description of the
[patient's] medical condition."'"5 Following the information release, "[t]he
local newspaper then featured on its front page the individual's x-ray and an
article that included the date of the accident, the location of the accident, the
patient's gender, a description of the patient's medical condition, and
numerous quotes from the hospital about such unusual sporting accidents.", "
HHS required the hospital to develop a new policy and procedure and to train
its staff members on that new policy and procedure. 87 The summary provided
by HHS does not indicate that the patient received any remedy for the
violation of his privacy rights.,' 8
Only a handful of the 32 case summaries mention any type of remedy for
the individual who suffered the privacy or security harm.,89 All but one of
these cases involved a patient who was initially refused access to the patient's
PHI but, after HHS's intervention, was subsequently given access.,9
0 In these
access-to-PHI cases, it is unclear from HHS's summary how long the individual
had to wait for a copy of his or her PHI and whether the PHI the individual
183. HHS, All Case Examples, supra note g1.
184. Id.
185. Id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Hospital Issues Guidelines
Regarding Disclosures to Avert Threats to Health or Safety").
186. Id.
187. Id.
i88. Id.
189. See generally id. (providing a list of HHS enforcement actions with a description of
covered entities' improper actions and the remedy).
igo. See id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Entity Rescinds Improper
Charges for Medical Record Copies to Reflect Reasonable, Cost-Based Fees," a case in which a
patient complained to HHS that "a covered entity failed to provide [the patient] access to his
medical records"; noting that OCR told the covered entity to give the patient access to his medical
records; further noting that the covered entity subsequently released the records to the patient
but then charged the patient an illegal non-cost-based fee for such records; finally noting that
the illegal fee also had to be corrected by HHS); id. (referring to the compliance enforcement
case titled "Private Practice Revises Process to Provide Access to Records," involving a similar fact
pattern in which "[a] private practice failed to honor an individual's request for a complete copy of
her minor son's medical record"); id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Private
Practice Revises Access Procedure to Provide Access Despite an Outstanding Balance," a case in
which a physician believed he could refuse to give a patient a copy of the patient's medical record if
the patient had an outstanding balance; noting that when HHS informed the physician that the
existence of a balance did not affect the patient's legal right to access her medical records under
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the physician provided the requested medical records to the patient).
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ultimately received was timely given the purpose for which the individual
needed it, such as care by a subsequent treating physician or a second surgical
opinion. In the one non-access-to-PHI case summary that mentions a remedy,
the summary does not specify the remedy other than stating that the covered
entity "mitigat[ed] ... harm to the complainant."',9
IV. A QuI TAM PROCESS
Section III.A of this Article found that HHS and state attorneys general
focus their settlement and penalty efforts on cases involving groups of patients
and insureds, leaving individuals whose privacy and security rights have been
violated out of the government enforcement spotlight. Sections III.B.1 and
III.B.2 of this Article found that the execution of settlement agreements and
the imposition of civil money penalties takes a considerable amount of time
-more than seven years in some cases-resulting in a lack of timely attention
to the privacy and security rights of both groups and individuals. Section
III.B.3 of this Article revealed that the corrective action required by HHS in
cases that do not reach the settlement or penalty phase, when that
information is made publicly available and is summarized by HHS for the
public, tends to be prospective in nature. Although prospective action, such
as the revision of policies and procedures and the re-training of workforce
members, helps safeguard future rights, it does little to remedy past harms.
Part III thus showed that HHS's current enforcement mechanisms do little to
support individual rights to privacy and remedies for violations thereof.,92 The
remainder of this Article responds to these limitations. That is, Parts IV, V,
and VI propose new federal regulations, the first of which, set forth in this
Part, would establish a process for qui tam plaintiffs who assist HHS in
identifying and investigating HIPAA Rules violations to receive a percentage
of any HHS settlement or penalty. Some background is necessary before
proceeding to this point.
On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed HITECH into law.'93
HITECH directed the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") to submit
to the Secretary of HHS within 18 months a report recommending
methodologies pursuant to which an individual who is harmed by a violation
of the HIPAA Rules may receive a percentage of any settlement with or penalty
191. See id. (referring to the compliance enforcement case titled "Health Sciences Center
Revises Process to Prevent Unauthorized Disclosures to Employers Covered Entity").
192. Cf Roger Hsieh, inproving HIPAA Enforcement and Protecting Patient Privacy in a Digital
Healthcare Environment, 46 LOY. U. Ciii. L.J. 175, 191-209 (2014) (arguing that HIPAA has failed
to protect patient privacy against increasing technological threats, and that federal laws allowing
state attorneys general to sue under HIPAA are also ineffective).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 (providing background information regarding
the passage of ARRA, including HITECH).
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imposed by HHS for such violation.'94 On August 9, 2010, the GAO timely
issued its report.95 The report identified and discussed three recovery
models, including an individualized determination model, a fixed recovery
model, and a hybrid model.9 6
The Secretary of HHS was supposed to consider these models and, within
three years of the date of HITECH (i.e., by February 17, 2012), issue
regulations selecting a model under which individuals harmed by violations
of the HIPAA Rules could receive a percentage of any HHS settlement or
penalty.'97 To date, HHS has yet to issue these regulations, due six years ago.
In a PowerPoint presented by HHS on March 7, 2017, HHS apparently stated
that these regulations were still on its "[1] ong-term [r]egulatory [a] genda."9 8
And, in Spring 2018, the Office of Management and Budget posted a public
notice on its regulatory agenda website stating that an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking ("ANPRM") would be published in November 2018
and would request public input regarding how HHS should share HIPAA
settlements and civil penalties with harmed individuals.99 Academics,
attorneys, consultants, and other professionals who work with the HIPAA
Rules have been waiting a long time for these regulations. Many are frustrated
by HHS's extreme regulatory delay in this area.2o The title of this Article ("A
Timely Right to Privacy") is drawn in part from this notable pause in agency
rulemaking.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 17939(c)(2) (2012) ("Not later than 18 months after [the date of the
enactment of the law], the Comptroller General shall submit to the Secretary a report including
recommendations for a methodology under which an individual who is harmed by an act. . .may
receive a percentage of any civil monetary penalty or monetary settlement collected with respect
to such offense.").
195. See Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gov't Accountability Office,
to the Honorable Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y of Health and Human Servs. (Aug. 9, 2010) (on file
with author) (providing the report on "Models for the Distribution of Civil Monetary Penalties"
in letter form).
196. See id. at 3-10 (identifying and discussing these three models).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 17939(c) (3) ("Not later than 3 years after [the date of enactment of the
law], the Secretary shall establish by regulation . . .a methodology under which an individual who
is harmed by an act that constitutes an offense ... may receive a percentage of any civil monetary
penalty or monetary settlement collected with respect to such offense.").
198. Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., PowerPoint Presentation, HCCA
2017 Compliance Institute, at slide 3 (Mar. 7, 2017) (on file with author).
199. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Office of Info. & Regulatory Aff., IIIPAA Enforcement:
Distribution of a Percentage of Civil Money Penalties or Monetary Settlements to Harmed Individuals,
REGINFO.GOv (Spring 2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?publd
=201804 &RIN=o 9 4 5 -AAo4.
200. See, e.g., Jeff Hardee, Hiow Will Proposed Additions to IllPAA Provisions Affect MSPs,
SOLARWINDS MSP (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.solarwindsmsp.com/blog/how-will-proposed-
additions-hipaa-provisions-affect-msps (discussing the forthcoming regulations; noting that "[o]nly
time will tell what effect this change will have in regard[] to HIPAA").
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Much of Part III focused on the relative inability of individuals, versus
groups, to see their HIPAA complaints trigger settlements or penalties.2o
Indeed, only four (7.69%) of the 52 cases selected by HHS for settlement
involved an individual versus a group.2 0 2 These settlements were entered into
with Shasta Regional Medical Center (after senior leadership at Shasta spoke
with numerous media outlets about an identifiable patient's condition
without the patient's authorization) ,23 New York and Presbyterian Hospital
(after senior leadership at the hospital allowed a television film crew to film
one dying and one distressed patient without the patients' authorization) ,204
Memorial Hermann Health System (after senior leadership at the health
system approved using a patient's name in a press release without the patient's
authorization),205 and St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center Inc. (after a St.
Luke's employee faxed extremely sensitive HIV and mental health
information to two patients' places of work).2o6 Even though HHS collected a
combined $5.26 million in settlement payments from these four covered
entities, 20 7 the individuals whose privacy rights were violated in these cases
received nothing. The groups of patients and insureds affected by the
violations that led to the other 48 settlement agreements as well as the four
civil money penalties also received nothing, even though complaints from
some members of those groups spurred HHS to take its settlement or penalty
action.
In response, this Article recommends that HHS publish a proposed rule
responding to President Obama's call in HITECH, now nine years old, to
allow private parties who bring HIPAA Rules violations to HHS to receive a
percentage of any settlement amount or penalty recovered by HHS. This
recommendation begs the question: What recovery model shall be set forth
in this proposed rule? One option is a fixed recovery model, such as the model
set forth in the federal False Claims Act ("FCA") with which many health care
attorneys and whistleblowers are familiar.
The FCA creates civil liability for any person who "knowingly presents" a
false claim for payment to the federal government, such as a false Medicare
claim; knowingly uses a false record, such as a false medical record or false
billing record, to induce the government to pay such false claim; conspires
201. See, e.g., supra Sections III.A.i-.3 .
202. See supra Section II.A.
203. See Resolution Agreement, Shasta Reg'l, supra note i i i, at 1-2 (summarizing the case);
infra Appendix A, at row 13 (cataloguing the case).
204. See NY Med Press Release, supra note 11 2 (summarizing the case); infra Appendix A, at
row 34 (cataloguing the case).
205. See Texas Health Press Release, supra note 114 (summarizing the case); infra Appendix A,
at row 48, col- 5.
206. See Resolution Agreement, St. Luke's-Roosevelt, supra note i 15, at 1; infra Appendix A,
at row 49, col- 5 (cataloguing the case).
207. See infra Appendix A, at rows 13, 34, 48, & 49, col. 4 (listing the settlement amounts in
each of these four cases).
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with respect to the preceding conduct; or knowingly uses a false statement to
decrease an obligation to pay money to the government, among other
conduct.2os Knowing conduct includes conduct involving "actual knowledge"
of a falsehood, as well as conduct involving "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless
disregard of the truth."209 Individuals who violate the FCA are "liable to the
[federal] [g]overnment for a civil penalty of not less than $5,ooo and not
more than $10,ooo, as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990 [("FCPIA")], .. . plus [three] times the amount of
damages . . . sustain [ed] [by the government] because of the act of that
person."2.o
The FCA permits a private individual (called a whistleblower, qui tam
plaintiff,- or qui tam relator) who has knowledge of past or present fraud
committed against the federal government to bring a suit in the government's
name and on the government's behalf.2' "If the [g]overnment proceeds with
[the] action brought by a [private] person," the private person can "receive
at least 15[%] but not more than 25[%] of the proceeds of the action or
settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the person
substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action," as well as
"reasonable attorneys' fees," costs, and expenses. 2 1 3 "If the [g] overnment does
not proceed with [the] action," the private person can receive an amount "not
less than 25[%] and not more than 301%] of the proceeds of the action or
settlement," as well as "reasonable attorneys' fees," costs, and expenses.
214
Thus, the FCA not only allows, but actually encourages, individuals with
knowledge of government fraud to quickly complete a significant portion of
the investigatory legwork necessary to prove a violation of the FCA which, in
turn, can result in a remedy, or bounty, for the individual.215
208. 35 U.S.C. § 3 7 2 9 (a)(L)(A), (B), (C), (G) (2012).
209. Id. § 3 7 29 (b)(i)(A).
210. See id- § 3729(a)(i) (setting forth these statutory amounts); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2017)
(setting forth, in table form, the higher, inflated amounts that currently apply to violations of the
FCA and other statutes under the FCPIA).
211. The term "qui tam" is derived "from the Latin phrase 'qui tam pro domino rege quamn pro se
ipso in hac parte sequitur,' which means he 'who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf
as well as his own.'" Pamela H. Bucy, Federalism and False Claims, 28 CARDoZO L. REV. 1599, 16oo
(2007) (translating and discussing the term); see, e.g., J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the
English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 550 (2000) (discussing the
meaning of the phrase).
212. See 31 U.S.C. § 3 7 30(b) (allowing a private person to bring a civil action for violations
of 31 U.S.C. § 3729).
213. Id.§ 3 7 3 o(d)(t).
214. Id.§ 3 7 30(d)(2).
215. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as MonioringDeuices in Government
Contracting 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 182 1-25 (1996) (providing an excellent discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of the FCA's qui tam provisions; on the advantage side, focusing on
the costs associated with government audits and inspections, the strength of the inside knowledge
possessed by employees compared to the superficial observations of external auditors and
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I recommend that HHS adopt a similar approach for HIPAA Rules
violations in a proposed rule that shall be codified as new 45 C.F.R. § 160.428.
This new proposed rule shall include sub-sections that: (1) give private
individuals the authority to bring an action in the name of HHS for violations
of subparts C, D, or E of part 164 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (i.e., the HIPAA Rules); (2) establish the process by which such
individuals shall bring an action in the name of HHS; (3) set forth the time
frames within which HHS shall review such actions and decide whether to
proceed with such actions; (4) state that HHS has the right not to proceed
with any particular action; and (5) establish the amounts, or amount ranges,
in percentage terms, that the private individual may recover if HHS proceeds
with the action and collects a settlement or penalty for a violation of the
HIPAA Rules.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, HHS shall request comments from
the general public as well as academics, attorneys, whistleblowers, and other
individuals who are familiar with the benefits and limitations of the FCA's qui
tam provisions2, 6 upon which this proposed rule is based. HHS shall edit the
proposed regulation in its final rule after considering the comments it
receives during the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. When the rule
becomes effective, it will provide a much-needed remedy to individuals who
assist HHS in identifying and investigating HIPAA Rules violations that lead
to settlements and penalties.'?
V. A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
"Ubijus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy."2' 8
The qui tam process proposed above would provide a remedy to those who
assist HHS in identifying and investigating HIPAA Rules violations that lead
to settlements and penalties. Through August i, 2018, however, HHS only
imposed settlements or penalties in 56 cases.2 9 The qui tam process identified
above could help individuals in these 56 cases, but only in these 56 cases.
Individuals and groups whose cases were not selected for settlement or
penalty would have no federal remedy due to the lack of a private right of
inspectors, and the ability of an employee with inside knowledge to quickly and correctly identify
and assess relevant information at a lower cost than an external government observer).
216. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(g) (codifying the FCA's qui tam provisions).
217. Cf Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 21st Century Oncology to Pay $26 Million to
Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 12, 2017), available at https://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/
2 ist-century-oncology-pay-26-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations (noting that a whistleblower
"will receive $2,000,000 as his share of the recovery associated with the" $26 million FCA case
the relator brought to, and in the name of, the U.S. Government).
218. See, e.g., Tracy A. Thomas, Ubijus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1633, 1636 (2004) ("Stated simply: Ubijus, ibi remedium.
Where there's a right, there must be a remedy.").
219. See infra Appendices A, B (cataloguing the 52 settlements and the four civil money
penalty cases, respectively).
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action in the HIPAA Rules.22o This Part responds by recommending a second
new federal regulation that would establish a private right of action for
violations of the HIPAA Rules. Some background is necessary before
proceeding to this point.
When a statute lacks a private right of action, an individual who is harmed
by a violation of that statute cannot file a lawsuit in federal or state court
seeking damages or an injunction designed to remedy the harms caused by
the statute violation. The case of Beaulieu v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital2
illustrates this legal point. In Beaulieu, pro se plaintiff Christopher Beaulieu
sued Frisbie Memorial Hospital, alleging that the hospital violated the HIPAA
Privacy Rule when it disclosed Beaulieu's brother's medical records to
Beaulieu without his brother's prior written authorization, causing Beaulieu
"a lot of stress and emotional problems."222
In a very briefjudicial opinion, the U.S. District Court for the District of
New Hampshire stated:
Beaulieu brings this action under HIPAA and the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, neither of which creates a private right
of action. "Rather, a patient must file a written complaint
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services through
the Office of Civil Rights. It is then within the Secretary's
administrative discretion whether to investigate complaints
and conduct compliance reviews to determine whether
covered entities are in compliance." Accordingly, Beaulieu
has failed to state a viable cause of action for the improper
release of his brother's medical records, and the complaint
should be dismissed.223
Although an individual cannot currently sue in federal or state court for
a violation of the HIPAA Rules, an individual can find an analogous common
law cause of action and file a lawsuit stating that cause of action instead. For
example, in R.K. v. St. Mary's Medical Center, a patient sued a hospital alleging
numerous state law tort claims following the hospital's unauthorized
disclosure of the patient's confidential health information.224 Although the
220. See supra note 70 (citing case law rulings that no private right of action exists for HIPAA
Rules violations).
221. Beaulieu v. Frisbie Mem'l Hosp., No. 12-cV-19i-JD, 2012 WL 4857036 (D.N.H.
Sept. 18, 2012).
222. Id.at*i.
223. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Spencerv. Roche, 755 F. Supp. 2d. 250,
271 (D. Mass. 2010)).
224. See, e.g., R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 7 1 5 , 7 17-18 (W. Va. 2012) (stating
common law "negligence, outrageous conduct, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent entrustment, breach of confidentiality, [and]
invasion of privacy" claims following the patient's discovery that his confidential health
information had been accessed by the defendant's employees and disclosed by such employees
to the plaintiffs estranged wife and the wife's attorney).
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hospital filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the patient's state law tort
claims were preempted by the HIPAA Rules and arguing that HIPAA contains
no private right of action, the court disagreed, ruling that the patient's
common law claims could proceed since they were not preempted by
HIPAA. 225
Although many states support common law causes of action for the
unauthorized disclosure of identifiable patient information,22 6 the catch is
that the HIPAA Rules contain a number of other rights and protections,
including those set forth in the Individual Rights and the Administrative
Requirements, for which there is no analogous common law duty or cause of
action. For example, most states do not require covered entities to provide
their patients with notices of privacy practices.2 2 7 Most states also do not
require covered entities to give patients the right to request additional privacy
restrictions,22S or to amend their PHI,29 or to receive an accounting of
disclosures of their PHI.23o Many states also do not require covered entities to
adopt physical, technical, and administrative safeguards designed to protect
the privacy of PHI.231 Two out of three of the violations committed by the
physician in the hypothetical that opened this Article are codified in the
Individual Rights and Administrative Requirements, not the Use and
Disclosure Requirements. Violations of the Individual Rights and
Administrative Requirements have caused my clients tremendous harm over
the past 15 years, yet most states do not address these issues.
225. Id. at 721 ("[W]e have located sufficient authority to clearly demonstrate that HIPAA does
not preempt state-law causes of action for the wrongful disclosure of health care information.").
226. See, e.g., Fairfax Hosp. ex rel. INOVA Health Sys. Hosps. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642, 643-45
(Va. 1997) (holding that a health care provider does owe a patient a duty not to disclose patient
information without the patient's authorization; upholding a $100,000 jury verdict for the
patient); MacDonald v. Clinger, 466 N.Y.S.2d 8oi, 802, 805 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding that
a patient may bring an action sounding in tort law against a psychiatrist who "disclos[es] personal
information learned during the course of treatment" to the patient's wife for "breach of
... fiduciary duty of confidentiality").
227. Cf 45 C.F.R. § 164-520(c) (2) (2017) (memorializing the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision
requiring direct health care providers to give patients a notice of privacy practices at the date of
first service delivery).
228. Cf id. § 164-522 (a) (i) (i), (iii) (memorializing the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision giving
individuals the right to request additional privacy restrictions and obligating covered entities to
adhere to agreed-upon restrictions).
229. Cf id. § 164.526(a)(1) (memorializing the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision giving
individuals the right to request amendment of their PHI).
230. Cf id. § 164.528(a)(1) (memorializing the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision giving
individuals the "right to receive an accounting of disclosures of [PHI]").
231. Cf id. § 1 6 4.530(c)(I) (memorializing the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision requiring
covered entities to establish safeguards to protect PHI). See generally Stacey A. Tovino, GoingRogue:
Mobile Research Applications and the Right to Privacy (forthcoming) (cataloguing and assessing
generally applicable state privacy, security, and breach notification laws; reporting that less than
half of states have generally applicable data security laws).
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In addition, although some states allow plaintiffs to use federal
regulations, such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, to establish a duty, and then a
violation of the regulation to establish a breach of duty sufficient to state the
negligence per se ("NPS") cause of action, not all states do. In LS. v.
Washington University, for example, the Eastern District of Missouri held that a
provision in the HIPAA Privacy Rule could be used to establish a duty for
purposes of NPS under Missouri Law.232 On the other hand, in Sheldon v.
Kettering Health Network, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held that the HIPAA
Rules could not be used to establish a duty for purposes of NPS under Ohio
law.s33 The Court in Sheldon reasoned that "utilization of HIPAA as an ordinary
negligence 'standard of care' [for purposes of NPS was] tantamount to
authorizing a prohibited private right of action for violation of HIPAA
itself."234
Given that patients and insureds who are injured by violations of the
Individual Rights and the Administrative Requirements have few remedies,
especially in states such as Ohio, this Article recommends that HHS publish a
proposed rule authorizing private rights of action for violations of the HIPAA
Rules. The proposed rule, to be codified at new 45 C.F.R. § 160.430, shall be
modeled after the private right of action set forth in the federal Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA"), with which many
health care attorneys are familiar.235
As background, EMTALA requires Medicare-participating hospitals with
emergency departments to provide individuals who request examination and
treatment an appropriate medical screening examination. 23 If, through the
screening examination, the patient is determined to have an emergency
medical condition, the hospital must provide the patient with necessary
stabilizing treatment37 or appropriately transfer the patient to another
medical facility that can stabilize the patient,238 all without regard to the
patient's ability to pay.
Like HIPAA, HHS can impose civil money penalties on hospitals that
violate EMTALA. 39 Unlike HIPAA, however, EMTALA also contains a private
232. I.S. v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:1 CV2 3 5 SNLJ, 2011 WL 2433585, at *2 (E.D. Mo. June 14,
201 1) ("[T]he Court finds that Count III may stand as a state claim for [NPS] despite its exclusive
reliance upon HIPAA.").
233. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 4 oN.E.3 d 661, 672 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) ("[W]e
further conclude that federal regulations-as opposed to an Ohio statute that sets forth a positive
and definite standard of care-cannot be used as a basis for [NPS] under Ohio law.").
234. Id.
235. See 42 U.S.C. § 13 9 5 dd (2012) (codifying EMTALA); id. § 1 3 9 5 dd(d)(2)(A)
(establishing a private right of action for patients injured by EMTALA violations).
236. Id.§ 13 9 5 dd(a).
237. Id. § 1 3 9 5 dd(b)(i)(A).
238. Id.§ 13 9 5 dd(b)(i)(B).
239. See id. § 1 3 9 5 dd(d) (i) (A) (authorizing HHS to impose "civil money penalt[ies] of not
more than $5 0,ooo" on hospitals with too or more beds, or not more than $25,000 on hospitals
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cause of action allowing individuals harmed by violations of EMTALA to sue
a hospital for damages in court under state law.214o This private cause of action
recognizes that HHS cannot possibly audit every Medicare-participating
hospital across the United States for violations of EMTALA and cannot timely
enforce all of the violations it identifies through audits, compliance reviews,
or complaints.
This Article therefore recommends that HHS propose a similar right of
action for incorporation into the HIPAA Rules. The proposed regulation shall
provide:
45 C.F.R. § 160.430. Civil Enforcement-Personal Harm.
Any individual who suffers personal or financial harm as
a direct result of a covered entity or business associate's
violation of subpart C, D, or E of part 164 of title 45 of the
Code of Federal Regulations may, in a civil action against the
covered entity or business associate, obtain those damages
available for such injuries under the law of the State in which
the covered entity or business associate is located, and such
equitable relief as is appropriate.
In the preamble to the proposed rule, HHS shall request comments from
the general public, including academics, attorneys, and other individuals who
are familiar with the benefits and limitations of EMTALA's private right of
action. HHS shall edit its proposed rule after considering the valuable
comments it will receive during the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.
When the rule becomes effective, it will provide a much-needed remedy to
individuals who are unable to enforce their privacy and security rights
through the administrative complaint process established by HHS.4V
VI. EXCLUSION AUTHORITY
Finally, this Article also recommends that HHS adopt a regulation
authorizing the Office of Inspector General ("OIG") to exclude any covered
with fewer than ioo beds, for violations of EMTALA); id. § 13 9 5 dd(d) (i) (B) (authorizing HHS
to impose "civil money penalt[ies] of not more than $50,ooo" on physicians who negligently
violate their on-call and other duties under EMTALA).
240. See id. § i 3 9 5 dd(d) (2) (A) (labeling the section "Civil Enforcement-Personal Harm").
241. Cf Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 9 8o F. Supp. 1341, 1343, 1348 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (allowing
plaintiff BarbaraJackson to bring a private action under EMTALA for damages arising from the
wrongful death of and personal injury to RobertJackson, her husband). CompareJack Brill, Note,
Giving HIPAA Enforcement Room to Grow: Why There Should Not (Yet) Be a Private Cause of Action,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2105, 2107 (2008) (concluding in 2oo8-a decade ago-that "the costs
of a [HIPAA] private [right] of action ... outweigh [ed] the benefits" and predicting, "with time,
[that] HIPAA compliance . .. [would] increase" without a private cause of action), with Sharona
Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 354-59 (2007) (justifying and recommending a
HIPAA private right of action).
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entity from participating in the Medicare and Medicaid Programs if the entity
grossly and flagrantly, or repeatedly, violates the HIPAA Rules. Some
background is necessary before proceeding to this final point.
Even in health law contexts in which there is a process for qui tam relators
and/or a private right of action, it may be economically efficient for an actor
to engage in proscribed behavior because the benefits of the behavior
outweigh the risks of the behavior. Consider, for example, a covered entity
that is offered $200,000 for the sale of PHI relating to a famous patient. The
civil money penalty for the one-time sale of the PHI, if a penalty is imposed
by HHS, may be in the range of $50,000.242 In addition, in cases in which
patients have sued covered entities under state common law for the one-time
wrongful disclosure of patient information, the damages tend to be in the very
rough range of approximately $ioo,ooo per wrongful disclosure.43 Thus, a
rational covered entity may decide to violate the HIPAA Rules by selling the
famous patient's PHI because the payment for the sale of the PHI ($200,000)
exceeds the sum of the expected civil money penalty by HHS and the
expected damages in the private lawsuit ($150,000).
Because rational health industry participants may decide to engage in
proscribed behavior in situations in which the benefits of the behavior
outweigh the risks, this Article recommends that HHS adopt a third
regulation authorizing the OIG to exclude a covered entity from the Medicare
and Medicaid Programs. This regulation would serve as a final deterrent to
behavior proscribed by the HIPAA Rules.
The government successfully uses exclusion as a compliance tool in other
health law contexts. For example, Medicare-participating facilities that pose
an immediate jeopardy to a Medicare beneficiary's physical health or safety
can lose their Medicare-participating status within 23 days if the unsafe
conditions are not immediately corrected.44 In my practice, I frequently
helped my Medicare-participating clients respond to these 23-day termination
threats from the federal government. I assisted my clients in quickly putting
an end to the dangerous conduct, removing the dangerous conditions, or
adopting prospective plans of correction so that they would not lose their
ability to participate in the Medicare Program. The potential loss of federal
health care program dollars was a tremendous compliance incentive for my
clients. Many health care providers and health care facilities rely heavily on
242. See 45 C.F.R. § 16o. 404(b) (2) (iii) (A) (2017) (stating that the appropriate civil money
penalty range for violations of the HIPAA Rules that are due to willful neglect but that are
corrected within 3o days is $10,000 to $50,000).
243. See, e.g., Fairfax Hosp. ex rel. INOVA Health Sys. Hosps., Inc. v. Curtis, 492 S.E.2d 642,
643-44, 648 (Va. 1997) (upholding a $ioo,ooo jury verdict for a patient in a case in which the
patient's provider disclosed the patient's information without the patient's authorization).
244. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.4to(a) ("If there is immediate jeopardy to resident health or safety,
the State must (and [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services] does) either terminate the
provider agreement within 23 calendar days of the last date of the survey or appoint a temporary
manager to remove the immediate jeopardy.").
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Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement and the loss of such reimbursement
is considered a financial death sentence in the health industry.245
This Article therefore recommends that HHS propose a third and final
new regulation for incorporation into the HIPAA Rules. This proposed
regulation shall provide:
45 C.F.R. § 160.43 2. Exclusion from Government Programs.
A covered entity that grossly and flagrantly, or repeatedly,
violates a provision in subpart C, D, or E of part 164 of title 45
of the Code of Federal Regulations shall be subject to
exclusion from participation in subchapter XVIII of title 42 of
the United States Code as well as State health care programs.
HHS shall request comments on this proposed rule not only from the
general public, but also from academics, attorneys, and other individuals who
are familiar with EMTALA's exclusion provision, on which this proposed rule
is based. HHS shall edit its proposed rule after considering the comments it
receives during the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. When this rule
becomes effective, it should provide a sufficient, and final, deterrent for
covered entities considering whether to violate the HIPAA Rules.24 6
245. See, e.g., Thomas Sullivan, IIHS OIG: Medicare and State Healthcare Programs: Fraud and
Abuse-OIG Proposes Revisions to Exclusion Authorities and "Early Reinstatement"for Certain Healthcare
Providers, POL'Y & MED., https://www.policymed.com/2o14/05/hhs-oig-medicare-and-state-
health-care-programs-fraud-and-abuse-revisions-to-the-office-of-inspector-gener-alsxclusion.html
(last updated May 6, 2018) ("[E]xclusion ... is referred to by many as a 'kiss of death' or 'death
sentence' due to the fact that Medicare and Medicaid are often vital revenue sources for
providers."). As an illustration, consider Dr. George E. Sloan, a randomly selected
hematologist/oncologist who practices medicine in Indiana. See Community Healthcare System,
Find a Doctor: George Sloan, M.D. Oncology-Hematology, COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE SYs. https://
www.comhs.org/find-a-doctor/s/sloan-george (last visited Nov. 18, 2o8) (summarizing Dr.
Sloan's areas of-practice). In 2015, Dr. Sloan received $2,164,385 in reimbursement from the
Medicare Program. See Medicare Unmasked, WALL ST. J., graphics.wsj.com/medicare-billing/#/
name=sloan&special=&city=&state (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) (providing Dr. Sloan's total
Medicare reimbursement in 2015). The threat of that reimbursement loss, even for one year,
likely would deter Dr. Sloan from violating the HIPAA Rules. Further consider Tenet Desert
Health System Inc., a randomly selected ambulatory surgery center ("ASC") located in Palm
Springs, California. Alex Kacik, Tenet Ups Stake in Ambulatory Surgery Center Chain, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Apr. 26, 2018), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/2o18O 4 26/NEWS/
180429918; Tenet Healthsystem Desert Inc., MANTA, https://www.manta.com/c/mm463jx/tenet-
healthsystem-desert-inc (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). The ASC received $2,109,261 in Medicare
reimbursement in the year 2015. See Medicare Unmasked, supra. Again, the threat of that
reimbursement loss, even forjust one year, should deter the ASC from violating the HIPAA Rules.
246. Cf Oulton v. Bowen, 674 F. SuPP. 429, 430, 438 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying a psychiatric
hospital's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent HHS from excluding it from the
Medicare Program for violating staffing and other Medicare conditions of participation); Kahn
v. Inspector Gen. of the U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 848 F. Supp. 432, 434, 437(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (upholding the mandatory exclusion of a NewYork podiatrist from the Medicare
Program for five years following his conviction for grand larceny); Greene v. Sullivan,
2o0g] 1403
IOWA LAWREVEW
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has carefully examined currently available federal and state
enforcement actions involving the HIPAA and HITECH Rules. Showing how
HHS and state attorneys general focus their settlement and penalty efforts on
cases involving groups of patients and insureds, this Article has argued that
individuals who suffer privacy- and security-related harms have received
relatively little enforcement attention. This Article has also revealed that the
execution of settlement agreements and the imposition of civil money
penalties take a considerable amount of time-more than seven years in some
cases-resulting in a lack of timely attention to the privacy and security rights
of both groups and individuals. Finally, this Article has explained that the
corrective action required by HHS in cases that do not reach the settlement
or penalty phase, when that information is made publicly available, tends to
be prospective but not remedial in nature. Although prospective action helps
safeguard future rights, it does little to remedy past harms.
Arguing that HITECH's improved enforcement provisions have done
little to support timely, individual rights to privacy and security, this Article
has proposed structure and content for three new federal regulations that
should be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.428, 160.430, and 160.432. If adopted
by HHS, these regulations will: (i) establish a process pursuant to which qui
tam plaintiffs can receive a percentage of any settlement or penalty imposed
by HHS for HIPAA Rules violations; (2) create a private right of action for
individuals harmed by HIPAA Rules violations; and (3) authorize the OIG to
exclude any covered entity that grossly and flagrantly, or repeatedly, violates
the HIPAA Rules from federal and state health care programs, including
Medicare and Medicaid.
More broadly, this Article has also gently inquired as to the proper role
of federal regulations that are not enforced, or that are enforced infrequently,
both in general and with respect to particular individuals.47 HHS has an
abundance of health, safety, and welfare regulations48 that can neither be
audited nor enforced on a timely basis. As an illustration, HHS started in
2o 1, auditing covered entities for compliance with the HIPAARules.249 Since
731 F. Supp. 835, 836, 838 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (upholding the mandatory exclusion of a Tennessee
pharmacist from the Medicare Program for five years for fraud).
247. Cf Ryan Meade, Call for Papers: Center for Compliance Studies 2018 Symposium "Wiat is the
Role of a Regulation if It Is Not Enforced?", LOY. U. Ciii. (Sept. 4, 2017), http://blogs.luc.edu/
compliance/ 20 7 /o9/o 4 /call-for-papers-center-for-compliance-studies-201 8-symposium-what-
is-the-role-of-a-regulation-if-it-is-not-enforced (asking this question of symposium participants).
248. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. Pt. 482 (codifying regulations governing Medicare-participating
hospitals); id. Pt. 483 (codifying regulations applicable to Medicare and Medicaid-participating
long-term care facilities); id. Pt. 484 (codifying regulations governing the provision of home
health services); id. Pt. 493 (codifying regulations governing the provision of laboratory services);
id. Pt. 494 (codifying regulations governing "end-stage renal disease facilities").
249. See Office for C.R., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., IIIPAA Privacy, Security, and
Breach Notification Audit Program, HHS.GOV., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
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2o11, HHS has audited 1'5 and 166 covered entities through its first and
second rounds of HIPAA audits, respectively.25o The United States is home,
however, to more than 1.9 million Medicare-participating health care
professionals, and that number does not include the hundreds of thousands
of other individual and institutional providers, health plans, and health care
clearinghouses that also meet the definition of a HIPAA covered entity.251
Although HHS's audit results are helpful to academics and practitioners who
wish to understand enforcement trends, the audits cannot be understood as
a meaningful deterrent of HIPAA Rules violations.
The research findings set forth in Part III of this Article also raise
questions regarding agency discretion in terms of cases selected for
enforcement and, more broadly, the theory and purpose of health
information privacy and security regulation. Will privacy and security cases
involving groups always be preferred by HHS due to the HHS regulation that
allows higher penalties for cases involving the PHI of more individuals?252 Do
privacy and security cases involving impermissible PHI uses and disclosures by
senior leadership2s3 garner significant enforcement attention simply because
HHS hopes to use those actions to send strong messages to senior leadership
to take HIPAA compliance seriously? If so, what about the individuals whose
rights are violated by rank-and-file employees? Are their privacy and security
rights any less important?254
compliance-enforcement/audit/index.htmI (last reviewed Dec. 1, 2016) (summarizing HHS's
HIPAA compliance audits).
250. See id. (stating the number of covered entities ( 15) audited during HHS's first, or pilot,
audit phase); Drew Gantt et al., Preliminary Results for Covered Entities Participating in the Phase 2
HIPAA Audit Program, HEALTH L. I STAT (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.healthcarestat.com/2017/
12/preliminary-resultseovered-entities-participating-phase--hipaa-audit-program (stating the number
of covered entities (166) audited during HHS's second audit phase).
251. See 45 C.F.R. § 16o. 103 (defining covered entity to include health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and "health care provider[s] who transmit[] ... health information in electronic
form in connection with [standard] transaction[s]"); Medicare Individual Provider List, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://data.cms.gov/Medicare-Claims/Medicare-Individual-
Provider-List/u8ug-2upx/data (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) (showing 1,923,127 current and
former individual providers in a search run on November 17, 2018).
252. See45 C.F.R. § 16o.48(a)(i) (listing "[t]he number of individuals affected" as the first
factor to be considered by HHS in determining the amount of a civil money penalty).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 203-o6 (referencing three cases involving
impermissible PHI disclosures by senior leadership that led to HHS enforcement).
254. See, e.g., Tobi M. Murphy, Enforcement of the IIIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving from Illusory
Voluntary Compliance to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54 LOY. L. REV. 155,
157-58 (2oo8) ("[C]onsider the additional number of smaller breaches that also likely occurred
in the same time period, but were not newsworthy enough for an entire nation or region to read
about. Despite the smaller scope of such incidents, it is doubtful these additional victims consider
their individual privacy breach any less significant." (footnote omitted)); id. at 158 ("[R]egardless
of the manner, scope, or location of a privacy breach, one thing remains the same: an individual's
trust in the privacy of his or her personal health information was damaged.").
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In addition, what is the exact theory behind HHS's regulation of health
information privacy and security? According to public statements made by a
former HIPAA regulator, HHS appears to be using its enforcement authority to
simply: (1) identify cases involving various privacy, security, and breach
notification issues; and (2) provide instruction (either through the publicly
available corrective action plan or through the publicly available notice of
proposed civil money penalty) regarding how covered entities and business
associates should comply with various provisions within the HIPAA Rules.255
HHS does not appear to be using its enforcement authority to actually try to
enforce all HIPAA rules violations; indeed, HHS enters into a settlement or
imposes a civil money penalty in only one-tenth of one percent (o.i%) of cases
involving a valid and timely-filed complaint over which HHS has jurisdiction.56
Whether the federal government lacks the desire or the capacity to penalize a
greater number of non-compliant entities is unclear, although it is likely that
one or both factors is at play.
Finally, is HHS consistently enforcing like violations? Do the cases that go
to settlement or penalty involve worse covered entity behavior57 or, perhaps, is
HHS's selective enforcement of the HIPAA Rules a form of deregulation?25
8
Going forward, it is my hope that both the data and recommendations set forth
in this Article will assist experts in administrative law in considering these
important questions in both health law and non-health law contexts.
255. See Polsinelli Webinar, supra note i17 (containing recorded statements by a former
government regulator regarding FIPAA enforcement; explaining that HHS "identifi[es] ... cases
... they feel will send a message to the industry ... . [w]here they can highlight different issues,
... [including issues involving paper PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and ePHI under the HIPAA]
[S] ecurity [R]ule that will be instructive for other covered entities and business associates to understand
... the different concerns that OCR continues to see over and over again . . . .").
256. As shown in Appendices A and B, HHS has entered into 52 settlement agreements and
has imposed civil money penalties in four cases for a total of 56 settlement or penalty civil
enforcement actions. See infra Appendices A, B. In comparison, HHS has received 54,521 valid,
timely filed, HIPAA complaints over which HHS has jurisdiction. SeeHHS, Enforcement Highlights,
supra note 13 (explaining that, in response to 26,071 of these complaints, HHS "require[ed]
changes in privacy practices" or provided technical assistance; further explaining that, in 28,450
of these complaints, HHS "intervened early and provided technical assistance"). Dividing 56
settlements and penalties by 54,521 (26,071 + 28,450) yields a 0.1027% (slightly more than one-
tenth of one percent) chance of a valid complaint resulting in a settlement or penalty, with the
remainder receiving only technical assistance or minor changes in privacy practices.
257. Compare cases discussed in Sections III.A. 4 and III.B.3 (involving corrective action that
did not lead to settlement or penalty), with cases discussed in Sections III.A. i-2 and HlI.B.1-.2
(leading to settlement or penalty). Both sets of cases involve like-natured violations.
258. See Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The Deep Industry Ties of Trump's Deregulation Teams,
NYTIMES (July 1 1,2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/i i/business/the-deep-industry-
ties-of-trumps-deregulation-teams.html ("President Trump entered office pledging to cut red
tape, and within weeks, he ordered his administration to assemble teams to aggressively scale back
government regulations."); Eric Lipton & Danielle Ivory, Trump Says His Regulatoiy Rollback Already
Is the 'Most Far-Reaching,'N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/
us/politics/trump-federal-regulations.html ("President Trump said ... that his administration was
answering 'a call to action' by rolling back regulations on ... health care ... and other industries. . . .").
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